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ABSTRACT
The

fear

of

legal

entanglements

deters

many

school

administrators from instituting service-learning programs in
secondary and postsecondary schools.

This paper reviews the

legal status of students enrolled in service-learning programs
which are required for conferral of a diploma or four-year
degree.

The effects of negligence,

school codes,

federal

labor laws, worker compensation determinations and volunteer
status on service-learners is examined.
secondary schools is discussed;

Mandatory service in

and insurance,

risk management for programs are considered.

vi

waivers and

CHAPTER I
SERVICE LEARNERS AND THE LAW:

AN ANALYSIS

Introduction
Service-learning is a philosophy of reciprocal learning:
"all parties in service learning --- those serving and those
served --- are learners and have influence in determining what
is to be learned.

Using this definition, service-learning

111

encompasses a wide variety of experience-based programs which
may

include

career development,

academic

knowledge,

skill

development or some combination of these for which students
may or may not receive compensation.
The critical instructional value of these experiencebased programs derives from the service performance of the
students and ''the outcomes of these activities for those off
campus

who

educational

are

the

value

recipients

for

the

of

student

the

services.

performing

112

the

The
service

should lead to a beneficial value for the individual or group
that is the recipient of the service and hopefully result in

1

Timothy Stanton, Service Learning: Groping Toward a
Definition, in Jane C. Kendall and Associates, ed., Combining
Service and Learning: A Resource Book for Community and Public
Service, Volume I (Raleigh, North Carolina: National Society
for Internships and Experiential Education) 65 (1990).
2

Id. at 66.
1

2

more effective participation in the larger society for both
the student service-provider and the recipient of the service.
Secondary

school and higher education students enrolled

in these programs function at the tangent of two legal worlds
the law of education and the law of labor.

As subjects of

the law of education, these students are exposed to a myriad
of rules, regulations and policy statements from the advent of
their expressed interest in the institution of choice through
matriculation and unto

conferral

of

a

diploma or degree.

Although they are expected to read, comprehend and act on and
in accordance with these documents,

many students refer to

these materials only during periods of registration and file
them on

bookshelves

without

ever

reading

these

documents

between terms. Consequently students are not fully cognizant
of the obligations and duties emanating from their contracts
of enrollment,

much less from any agreements arising

program-imposed

placements

which

may

create

out of

employment

relationships and subject students to yet another legal arena,
the law of labor.
This

paper

examines

the

legal

status

of

the

constituencies engaged in service-learning placements which
are

required

for

conferral

of

a

diploma

or

degree.

It

attempts to clarify the status of the service-learner, student
or

employee,

for

purposes

of

liability,

compensation

and

insurance. Because much of the law of education and the law of
labor is based on state codes which are constructed to meet

3

the needs of local populations, a deliberate effort was made
to limit this discussion to states included in the seventh
circuit.

However,

circuit

compelled

arising

outside

a

dearth of

the

writer

these

to

related case
consider

jurisdictions

when

law

in

judicial
the

this

issues

legal

cases

provided interpretations germane to this inquiry.
It is also important to note that in this paper, servicelearning refers to only those required experiences which are
incorporated into the curriculum and is not synonymous with
community

service

or

volunteerism

which

is

separate

and

distinct from course requirements.

Procedure
This study was initiated with a key word search using
service and learning.

After reading journal articles related

to service and learning,

the descriptors were combined and

delimited by the term legal issues.

At this point, the focus

of the review of literature turned to law review articles.

To

better identify appropriate articles, the writer utilized the
Index

to

Legal

Periodicals

(I.L.P.),

Current

Law

Index

(C.L.I.), Legal Resources Index (L.R.I.) and Current Index to
Legal Periodicals (C.I.L.P.).

Where law review articles were

cited in court decisions, Shepard's Law Review Citations were
used for cross referencing and to locate additional related
readings.

Other finding tools included the two major legal

encyclopedias,

American

Jurisprudence

2d

(Am

Jur

2d)

and

4

Corpus Juris Secundum

(CJS),

which were useful for concept

Words and Phrases enabled the writer to create

development.

links between ideas when none were apparent.
Each of the cases reported in this paper can be located
through the West Digest Systems.
cited,

Where state statutes are

they were verified by locating the statutes for the

particular state and reading the annotated versions whenever
possible.
The legal analysis which follows is the final phase in a
multi-faceted study of service-learning.
of the study determined:

(1)

The initial stages

the effect of tutoring on the

tutors's related class achievement; (2) the effect of tutoring
on the tutees; and (3) the change in the tutors' perceptions
of the socio-economic factors that influence student learning.
This phase of the writer's study was undertaken to determine
the

legal

status

of

service-learners

relative

to

the

institutions that sponsor them and the institutions that host
them.
The review of literature and legal cases in Chapter II
establish a
students

and

framework
their

secondary education.

for

the

legal

institutions

in

relationships between
higher

education

and

An understanding of this relationship is

germane to assignment of liability when cases arise out of
negligence.

In Chapter III the writer explores common legal

issues which arise in several categories of service-learning.
These include skill-based programs which often are fraught

5

with issues based in negligence;
instances
teachers

define
and

the

other

legal

school

school codes which in some

status

of

personnel

teachers,

relative

learning placements and clearly codify the
relationship in secondary education;

to

student
service-

student-school

the terms and conditions

of the Fair Labor Standards Act which clarifies the federal
government's
employer;
shed

interpretations

Workers'

light

on who

of

who

is

an

employee

and

Compensation Board determinations which
receives

benefits

and when;

and

legal

problems related to service-learners classified as volunteers.
Issues brought under the United States Constitution are dealt
with

in

Chapter

IV which

service-learning as a
Thirteenth Amendment.

examines

the

novel

concept

of

form of slavery forbidden under the
Chapter V looks at insurance, waivers,

and risk management for service-learning programs;
final chapter summarizes the findings.

and the

CHAPTER II
STUDENT-SCHOOL RELATIONSHIPS
In Higher Education
The law of higher education, still in its infancy,

is

premised on the existence of a contract of enrollment which
defines the student-university relationship. 3
3

Although most

Robert L. Cherry, Jr. and John P. Geary, The College
Catalog As a Contract, 21 J.L.& Educ. 1 n.l(Winter 1992);
Audrey Wolfson Latourette & Robert D.
King,
Judicial
Intervention in the Student-University Relationship:
Due
Process and Contract Theories, 65 U.Det.L.Rev. 199(1988);
David Davenport, The Catalog in the Courtroom: From Shield to
Sword? 12 J.C.& U.L. 201 n.2 (1985); Victoria J. Dodd, The
Non-contractual Nature of the Student-University Contractual
Relationship, 33 Kan.L.Rev. 702 (1985); Donald L. Reidhaar,
Assault on the Citadel: Reflections on a Quarter Century of
Change in the Relationships Between the Student and the
University, 12 J.C.& U.L. 343 (Winter 1985); Eileen K.
Jennings, Breach of Contract Suits by Students Against Postsecondary Education Institutions: Can They Succeed? 7 J.C.&
U.L. 191n.3-4 (1980
1981);
Virginia Davis Nordin, The
Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable Theory of the
Student-University Relationship, 8 J.C.& U.L. 141n.2 (19801982) for discussion of five other theories of studentuniversity relationships (i.e.: constitutional analysis, 'in
loco parentis', fiduciary theory, theory of privilege, and
status of private association law); L. Ray, Toward Contractual
Rights for College Students, 10 J.L.& Educ. 163 (1981);
William G. Millington, The Law and the College Student:
Justice in Evolution 12 - 13 (1979);
Douglas J. Drushal,
Comment, Consumer Protection and Higher Education-Student
Suits Against Schools, 37 Ohio St.L.J. 608 (1976); Samuel K.
Bell, Case Notes, Contracts
Paynter v. N. Y. U.:
How
Discretionary are the Inherent Powers of Universities? XXI
DePaul L.Rev. 861 (1972);
Anthony v. Syracuse Univ. 231
N.Y.S. 435 (1928), 224 App. Div. 487, 130 Misc. Rep. 249, 223
N.Y.S. 796; Johnson v. Lincoln Christian College, 150 Ill.
(continued ... )
6

7

courts since the late nineteenth century have construed the
student-university

relationship

as

contractual 4 ,

an

examination of relevant court cases reveals a notable lack of
agreement on almost any application of contract law. 5

Still

3

( • • • continued)
App. 3d 733 (1986); Steinberg v. Chicago Medical Sch. 41 Ill.
App. 3d 804 (1976), 69 Ill.2d 320 (1977) 371 NE 2d 634 (Ill.
1977), Wilson v. Ill. Benedictine College 112 Ill. App. 3d.
932 (1983).
4

Douglas Drushal, Comment,
Consumer Protection and
Higher Education---Student Suits Against Schools, 37 Ohio
St.L.J. 608 at 612 (citing State ex re. Stallard v. White, 82
Ind. 278 (1882) as one of the earliest contract cases in
American higher education).
5

For offer and acceptance: compare Steinberg v.Chicago
Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320, 329-30, 371 N.E.2d 634, 639
(1977); People ex rel Tinkoff v. Northwestern Univ., 333 Ill.
App. App. 224, 232, 77 N.E. 2d 345, 349 (1947), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 829 (1948); Niedermeyer v. Curators of Univ. of Mo.,
61 Mo. App. 654, 657 (Kan. City App. 1895); Cazenovia College
v. Patterson, 45 A.D. 2d 501, 5012 360 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (1974);
Silver v. Queens College, 63 Misc. 2d 186; 311 N.Y.S.2d 313,
314 (N.Y.C. Civ.Ct. 1970).
For duration of contract: compare Koblitz v. Western
Reserve Univ., 11 Ohio C.C. 515,21 Ohio Cir. Dec. 144 (1901)
with Peretti v. Montana, 464 F.Supp. 784 (D. Mont. 1979);
Eisele v. Ayers, 63 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 381 N.E. 2d 21 (1978);
Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W.
589 (1901); Niedermeyer v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 61 Mo.
App. 654 (Kan. City App. 1895); Eden v. Board of Trustees, 49
A.D.2d 277, 374 N.Y. S.2d 686 (1975); Galton v. College of
Pharmaceutical Sciences, 70 Misc. 2d 12, 332 N.Y.S. 2d 909
(Sup. Ct. 1972);
Samson v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101
Misc. 146, 167 N.Y.S. 202 (Sup.Ct.) aff'd, 181 A.D. 936, 167
N.Y.S. 1125 (1917); Horner School v. Wescott, 124 N.C. 518, 32
S.E. 885 (1899); Behrend v. State, 55 Ohio App. 2d 135, 379
N.E.2d 617 (1977).
For nature of contract: compare Drucker v. New York
Univ., 59 Misc. 2d 789, 790, 300 N.Y.S. 2d 749, 751 (App. Term
1969), aff'd, 308 N.Y.S.2d 644 (App. Div. 1970); Miami
Military Inst. v. Leff, 129 Misc. 481, 220 N.Y.S. 799 (Buffalo
City Ct. 1926); Kabus v. Seftner, 34 Misc. 538, 540, 69 N.Y.S.
983, 984 (App. Term 1901) with Cazenovia College v. Patterson,
45 A.D. 2d 501, 503, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 84, 87 (1974).
(continued ... )

8

contract

analogy remains

resolution

between

the

students

favored approach for dispute
and

private

colleges, 6

occasionally it applies to public colleges also. 7

and

Moreover,

courts currently disallow rigid application of contract law
because

of

the

uniqueness

of

the

student-university

relationship. 8
As more flexible interpretations of contract law gained
acceptance, the complexity of the contract increased and its
ambit was expanded to include numerous published institutional
sources and the oral representations of faculty and other
university representatives. 9

Gradually implied-in-law

5

( • • • continued)
For discussion of catalog provisions: Drucker v. New York
Univ.,
57 Misc. 2d 937, 293 N.Y.S. Civ.Ct. 1968, rev'd 59
Misc. 2d 789, 300 N.Y.S. 2d 749 (App. Term 1969), aff'd 308
N.Y.S. 2d 644 (App. Div. 1970).
6

Samuel Bell,
Contracts---Paynter v.
New York
University:
How Discretionary Are the Inherent Powers of
Universities, XXI DePaul L. Rev.861 (1972) at 869 stating that
students
attend
private
institutions
under
strictly
contractual agreements.
7

See Anderson v Regents of University of California, 22
Cal App 3d 763, 99 Cal Rptr 531 (1972).
8

Slaughter v. Brigham Young University, 514 F.2d 622,
626 (1975) stating "some elements of the law of contracts are
used and should be used in the analysis of the relationship
between plaintiff and university to provide some framework
into which to put the problem ... This does not mean that
'contract
law'
must
be
rigidly applied
in
all
its
aspects ... The student-university relationship is unique, and
it should not be stuffed into one doctrinal category. It may
also be different at different schools."
9

David Davenport, The Catalog in the Courtroom: From
Sheild to Sword? 12 J.C.U.L. 2:201, 202 (1985).

9

contracts 10

emerged

decisions. 11

as

However,

the

"dominant

these

concept"

contracts,

in

prepared

court
by

the

school (the dominant party) to be signed by the student (the
weaker party)
contracts

of

who has no voice in the terms,

manifest as

adhesion when utilized by students

in suits

against their universities.
With full knowledge of the unequal relationship between
the parties, courts continue to analyze cases under a variety
of

legal

theories 12

contract theory.

displaying

a

distinct

preference

Judgements of these courts represent

for
"a

remarkably solid common law tradition favoring institutional
discretion." 13
from

these

institutions

The only undisputed legal principle emanating
decisions
as

parties

acknowledges
to

a

students

somewhat

and

amorphous

their
higher

education contract.
10

Black, at 135 stating that one of the reasons for an
implied-in-law
contract
is
"because
of
some
special
relationship between [the parties] 11
11

Virginia Davis Nordin, The Con tract to Educate:
Toward a More Workable Theory of the Student-University
Relationship, 8 J.C.U.L. 2:141, 179 (1980-81).
12

Audrey Wolfson Latourette and Robert D. King, Judicial
Intervention in the Student-University Relationship:
Due
Process and Contract Theories, 65 U.Det.L.R. 199, 234 (1988)
addressing contract theory as the most pervasive theory among
four theories which courts utilize for analysis of the
student-university relationship; see also Virginia Davis
Nordin,
The Contract to Educate:
Toward a More Workable
Theory of the Student-University Relationship, 8 J.C.U.L.
2:141, 143n.5 (1980 -82) describing six theories of student
university relationships.
13

Laura Krugman Ray, Toward Contractual Rights
College Students,
10 J.L. & Educ. 163, 163 (1981).

for

10
Case law defines a contract as

"an agreement between

competent parties, upon consideration sufficient in law, to do
or not to do a particular thing." 1 4

Though the college or

university catalog is not labelled a contract and the parties
don't

sign it,

the catalog represents

the nucleus of

agreement between a university and its students. 15
the

catalog

students

signifies

of

an

requirements,
information,

the

legal

institution's
pertinent

and

the

document

financial

rules

and

aid

In courts

which

course offerings,
and

regulations

the

apprises

admissions

registration
which

govern

academic and disciplinary matters.
As

a

contract

the

catalog

creates

institution and its enrolled students . 16

duties
Duties,

for

the

commonly

referred to as tort obligations, are created by law, separate
from the expressed or implied intentions of the parties to a
contract. 17

When these duties are arbitrarily

disregarded,

they may be judicially enforced as a consequence of an action

14

People v. Drummer (1916), 274 Ill. 637, 640 as cited
in Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320, 329
(Dec. 1977).
15

See supra note 3; also recall that contract terms
could work in favor of either party, school or student, as
could terms of the contract that are nowhere spelled out
explicitly but are understood by most people associated with
higher education or a particular educational institution.
16

DeMarco v. University Health Sciences (1976), 40 Ill.
App.3d 474, 480 discussing contract in relations to a private
institution.
17

W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law
of Torts, sec. 92 at 656 (5th ed. 1984).

11
based in tort . 18
Tort

is derived from the Latin word "tort us, " which

means " a twisting" 19 •

When applied to conduct, tort refers

to improper or crooked conduct . 20

Defined broadly,

a tort

becomes a civil wrong other than a breach of contract 21 for
which a court will provide a remedy.
action

for

available. 22

damages,

al though

other

The remedy may be an
remedies

may

also

be

To discourage interference with the interest of

a service-learner, an educational institution, or any other
legal entity that is entitled to legal protection,

the law

imposes tort obligations. 23

18

Id.

19

E.A. Andrews, ed. Harpers' Latin Dictionary: A New
Latin Dictionary.
Founded on the translation of Freund' s
Latin= German Lexicon.
Revised by Charlton T Lewis, Ph.D.
and Charles Short, LL.D.
(New York: American Book Company,
1907) at 1880c.
20

Stuart M. Speiser, Charles F. Krause, and Alfred W.
Gans, The American Law of Torts (1983) sec. 1:20 defining tort
as a "breach of duty imposed either by statute or by case law
and not by contract."
21

See Prosser stating that "Contract liability is
imposed by the law for the protection of a single, limited
interest, that of having the promises of others performed.
Quasi-contractual liability is created for the prevention of
unjust enrichment of one person at the expense of another and
the restitution of benefits which in good conscience belong to
the plaintiff;" see also Speiser et al. , supra note 1 7
indicating that a contract breach arises from agreement of the
parties whereas a tort is a violation of a duty which is fixed
by law independent of a contract or the will of the parties.
22

W. Page Keeton et al.,Prosser and Keeton on the Law
of Torts,at 4 (5th ed. 1984).
23

Id., sec. 92 at 656; see also supra notes 17, 18.

12
Because tort obligations or duties are created primarily
on the basis of public policy reasons, 24 liability in tort
actions stems from

conduct against public policy,

conduct

As noted above,

the law

which is socially unreasonable. 25
entitles a
upheld.

student to protection for duties which are not

This protection is a manifestation that the policy

reflected in a given situation has received consideration. 26
In the current milieu of higher education, some courts do
not

recognize

interpretation

any
flows

university
from

the

duty

students.

to

decisions

in

This

Bradsha-..v2 7 and

Rabel 28 in which both courts preconditioned the imposition of
24

Id., sec.92 at 655.

25

Id. at 6; see also Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James,
Jr., & Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts (second Ed.) Vol. 3
(1986) sec.16.1 stating that negligence is unreasonably
dangerous conduct which whether by act or by omission of an
act must be voluntary (e.g. not premeditated) and exists under
two theories:
(1) conduct theory which if respected in a
court of law would exclude as irrelevant evidence introduced
to show an actor's state of mind and (2) state of mind theory
which if accepted tends to appropriate a closer correspondence
between legal liability and the moral culpability of the actor
and requires a finding of indifference or inadvertence or that
anxious care precluded the negligence.
26

W. Prosser, Torts, sec. 20, 53

(1971).

27

Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138-140 (3rd Cir.
1979) discussing society's acceptance of the college student
as an adult as changing the relationships which underlie tort
analysis in student-university suits in the context of student
activities.
28

Rabel v. Ill. Wesleyan University, 161 Ill. App. 3d
348, 359 (1987) stating that "[f] or purposes of examining
fundamental relationships that underlie tort liability,
competing interests of student and institution of higher
learning are much different today than they were in the
(continued ... )

13
a duty upon a university to act with reasonable care for the
safety

of

its

students

on

the

existence

of

a

custodial

relationship between a student and the university.

Applying

the reasoning of Bradshaw and Rabel, since a college no longer
stands

"in

recedes. 29

loco

parentis"

Courts

which

recognize no duty of
students.

relationship
custody.

between

its

accept

care by a

its

students,

this

line

of

duty

reasoning

college/university to its

This perspective is tenuous.

Restatement

11

to

can

1130

of

(Second)
give

Since

colleges

rise

the

and

Torts
to

law

their

indicates

duty

in

recognizes

students

as

the
the

a

special

absence

of

relationship

unique, 31

then

by

definition this relationship is special and therefore can give
rise

to duty.

Furthermore,

11

•••

the

law appears

... to be

working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or
protect

in

dependence.
For

any

relation

of

dependence

or

mutual

the

factual

11 32

an

action

in

setting must be proper.

tort

to be

successful

That an institution has a duty to

28

( • • • continued)
past ... the change has occurred because society considers the
modern college student an adult, not a child of tender years. 11
29

See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138-140 (3rd
Cir.1979).
30

Restatement, sec. 314-328.

31

Slaughter, 514 F.2d 622, 626.

32

Restatement, sec. 314A, comment(b)

14

prevent a service-learner from exposure to unreasonable harm
must be established under the law or by fact. While duty may
be

plausible

in

the

context

of

the

student-university

relationship, it may be difficult to sustain because no widely
accepted test exists to prove the existence of duty. 33 It is
determined

by

protection; 34

whether
and

as

a

student

noted

is

earlier,

deserving
duty

is

of

legal

premised

on

considerations of public policy which lead the law to say a
particular learner is entitled to protection. 35
Once it is established that a duty exists,

it must be

shown that the institution failed to conform to standards of
care

provided

circumstances. 36
the university,

other

by
Next

in

institutions

similar

the service-learner must prove that

through its agents, acted unreasonably; and

these unreasonable actions exposed the student to undue risk
of

harm.

For

tort

based

on

negligence

to

exist,

this

connection must be substantiated.
Finally,

a

causal

relationship

must

be

established

between the injury the learner experiences and the misconduct

33

Drushal, supra note 2, at 619.

34

Keeton et al., supra note 21, sec.92.

35

Id. at sec. 53.

36

Id. at sec. 30 - 33.

15
perpetrated by the institution. 37

In other words, it must be

shown that the injury suffered or the loss experienced was a
result

of

the

misconduct

was

institutions's
the

proximate

misconduct
cause 38

of

and
the

that· this

harm

to

the

student. 39
Non-contractual suits involving service-learning which
are

brought

institutions
because

against
most

degree-granting

post-secondary

likely

would

service-learning

be

founded

requirements

in

on

the

negligence
context

of

education encompass programs which involve experience-based or
field-based components.

Programs with these components may

require complex arrangements to provide adequate supervision
for university students as well as protection for receiving
and

sending

institutions

and

third

party

recipients

of

services.

In Secondary Schools
While the law of higher education continues to evolve

37

It is usually the responsibility of a jury to
determine what precautions are appropriate to the harm at
issue.
38

See Roberts v. Robertson County Board of Education,
692 S. W. 2d 870 qouting from the Supreme Court of Tennessee
that proximate cause is "an act or omission occurring or
concurring with another which, if it had not happened, the
injury would not have been inflicted;" and that the proximate
cause need not be the sole nor last cause of injury nor the
only cause and that recovery from multiple parties separately
or jointly is possible.
39

Keeton et al., supra note 121 at sec. 30.
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premised upon the existence of a contract between the student
and the institution, the law of public education as applied to
legal issues originating in lower schools accepts the studentinstitution
contracts

relationship
control

as

(typically

"in

loco

in

Where

parentis."

private

they

schools),

generally are viewed as quasi-contracts; and actions in tort
at this level of education usually are rooted in negligence
premised on lack of or improper supervision.
As in higher education,
schools

presents

problems

service-learning in secondary

which

may

be

spawned by

joint

venture control or aberration of control with an intent to
shift

liability

by

one

of

the

parties,

lack

of

clear

delineations of responsibilities and rights between and among
the parties, or
law.

unclear legal theories in the area of school

At all levels of education,

bear directly upon the issues.

context and circumstance

However, the ages of students

are of particular significance to the circumstances bearing
upon

legal

issues

Consequently
truncated

as

in
the

which

these

originate

arenas,

in

rights

responsibilities

of

secondary
of

schools.

students

faculty,

may

staff

be
and

administration for control and supervision may be increased.
As early as 1905 the Supreme Court began hearing cases
related to student rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
that year,

In

it affirmed the right of a state to require all

17
community inhabitants to be vaccinated. 40

By 1922 the Court

had affirmed the right of a city to require vaccination as a
condition of enrollment in public and private schools. 41
the

boundaries

of

students'

recognized

the

validity

statutes. 42

Although

of

rights

evolved,

compulsory

immunization

other

school

statutes

and

As

courts

attendance
compulsory

attendance laws had been affirmed, required participation in
activities which conflict with students' ideological positions
or denial of a right to engage in activities which affirm
their ideological beliefs resulted in mixed outcomes until the
1943 Barnette decision disallowing required participation in
the

flag

pledge

and salute

at

the

expulsion 43 and indicating that a

risk of

punishment

or

state law which impinges

139 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.11 (1905) holding that
a board of health had the right to require all community
inhabitants to be immunized and exempt those children who for
medical reasons could not withstand vaccination.
41

Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).

42

See Scoma v. Chicago Board of Education, 391 F. Supp.
452 (N.D. Ill 1924).
43

Compare Minerville School District v. Gobi tis, 310
U.S.
586
(1940)
(finding
a
mandatory
flag
salute
constitutional) with
Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583
(1943) (holding it unconstitutional for a state to punish
those who for religious convictions urge and even advise
others not to salute the national and state flags) and West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (holding that students who refuse to salute and pledge
allegiance to the flag may not be suspended or expelled from
school) which effectively overruled the Court's decision in
Gobitis three years earlier; see also Sherman v. Community
Consolidated District 21 of Wheeling Township, 714 F. Supp.
932 (N.D.Ill. 1989) for a recent case where a student who
objected to the Pledge of Allegiance on religious grounds
stated a cause for action.
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upon Constitutional rights will be sustained only if the state
law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
However,

by the

late 1960s and

into the early 1970s

student challenges to the First and Fourteenth Amendment had
progressed from issues centered on required participation to
limitations on protected expressive conduct which the Supreme
Court determined as subject for strict scrutiny. 44 Later in
the decade, under certain conditions daytime school attendance
in at

least one state could be used as a predictable and

economical

basis

for

determining

ineligibility

for

unemployment benefits for otherwise eligible persons without
violating

the

Amendment.

equal

However,

ineligibility

status

protection
this
on

same

clause
statute

otherwise

of

the
did

eligible

Fourteenth
not

assign

night

school

attendees. 45
During the 80s, the Supreme Court determined that school
officials

could discipline

students

for

speech

plainly offensive to students and teachers.

which was

Where in 1943

44

See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District 393 U.S. 503 (1969) for a case in public school
secondary education which held that disciplining students for
peaceful wearing of armbands, the issue in this case, or other
peaceful symbolic expression of opinion was unconstitutional
unless it could be shown that material disruption or
substantial interference with the educational process did or
would result; see also Heady v James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) for
a case in higher education that extended the Tinker decision
to the associational rights of college students.
45

( 1977)

Idaho Department of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100

19
students in Taylor

46

were granted the right to advocate for

their religious beliefs which were not found subversive to
government,
advocate

the

Court

unpopular

and

now

balanced

controversial

students'
views

rights
against

to
the

school's interest in teaching students the fundamental values
of the community which included socially acceptable behavior.
Because some students in secondary schools are minors,

the

Court based its opinion on precedent that valued protecting
minors from exposure to language identified as vulgar and
offensive. 47
The Court further bounded the school's authority to limit
the expressive conduct of its students when in 1988 it was
asked to determine the extent of a principal's authority to
edit the content of a school newspaper written and produced as
part of a

journalism class. 48

Using Tinker49 and Fraser5°,

the Court identified the public school as a special context
for the First Amendment and determined that schools need not
tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with the basic
purposes of public school education as long as the speech

46

47

Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
See Bethel School District v. Fraser,

478 U.S.

675

(1986).
48

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562

(1988) .
49

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
50

Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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occurs as part of the school curriculum or in an activity
sponsored
between

by

the

truncated

school . 51

The

expressive

classroom forum and the

11

Court

conduct

also

distinguished

permissible

in

a

wider latitude" accorded speech in a

public forum which includes student government as a segment of
the public. Furthermore no clear-cut rule emerged to delineate
when public school programs conflict with parental rights; 52
and currently no case law designates education a fundamental
right.

Consequently only a

common law right continues to

51

For a discussion of the First Amendment rights of
students in relationship to library materials, see Board of
Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (indicating that while school boards
have broad discretion in controlling library content, when
materials proven to have educational value are removed because
the board disagrees with the content and acts to impose its
own point of view the act of removing the materials violates
students'
First Amendment rights);
see also Pratt v.
Independent School District Number 831, Forest Lake, 670 F.2d
771 ( 8th Cir. 1982) (declaring unconstitutional under the
First Amendment a board's decision to remove a certain film
from the high school curriculum based on the board's
ideology) .
52

Compare Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (stating that a state may require school attendance and
while it may not restrict that attendance to only public
institutions, it may regulate all schools within reason) which
premised its holding in part on the Fourteenth Amendment
protection of persons from arbitrary state action impairing
parents' liberty interest to direct the education of their
children with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (stating
that compulsory secondary school attendance cannot be imposed
on parents in an Amish community where this requirement will
display a detrimental effect on a way of life in which
religious belief and practice are inseparable from daily
living which has been shown to produce responsible, selfsufficient citizens) which based its holding on the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment; both cases while
protecting parents' rights to direct the education of their
children find their support in different Amendments because
the issues were presented from different perspectives.
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exist

for

parents

to excuse

their off spring

from

certain

classes when they raise objections based on a values conflict.
Mandating community service in secondary schools has raised
such objections.

CHAPTER III
LEGAL ISSUES IN SERVICE-LEARNING PROGRAMS

Negligence
The term negligence, as used in court cases, may cause
confusion because of its dual meanings. Often negligence is
defined as a tort characterized by four previously described
elements:

( 1)

Z owes a duty of reasonable care to Y;

( 2) A

breach of that duty occurs; (3) Y receives injury or harm; and
(4) The harm or injury to Y results from the breach of duty by

z.

When a student or group of students bringing a tort claim

based in negligence proves each of these conditions, damages
may be awarded.
However, in a more restrictive sense, negligence means a
breach of duty,
expected care.

the failure to live up to the standard of
This is the second element of a tort claim

based in negligent conduct.
member

or

other

school

A student alleging that a faculty
employee

or

a

legal

entity

"is

negligent" means that the named person or group failed to
exercise

appropriate

care

under

the

circumstances.

What

constitutes appropriate care is a question of fact for a court
of law to determine.
Liability for the tort of negligence is contingent on the
negligent conduct causing injury.
22

However, a teacher may be

23

negligent without being liable for negligence. To comprehend
this concept,

it is important to differentiate between the

tort of negligence

(see par.

1 above)

and the more limited

concept of negligence, the breach of the duty of reasonable
care (see par. 2 above).

Court cases seldom distinguish these

two concepts of negligence.
The duty of reasonable care may give rise to further
confusion.
to a

It does not require a teacher to avoid all injury

student.

Instead,

the duty of reasonable care only

compels that a teacher avoids injuring a student or group of
students by carelessness in

the teacher's actions.

negligence may result in two ways:

This

(1) The teacher may omit

to act in a manner consistent with the ordinary actions of a
reasonable person in a similar context; or (2) The teacher may
act in a manner that a reasonable and prudent person usually
would not act under similar circumstances.
To illustrate the feasibility of a reasonable person,
consider the thought process of such a teacher, a teacher who
unfailingly

chooses

to

act

with

moderation

and

to

appropriately evaluate her own actions as well as the actions
of others in everything she undertakes.
the

incredible

breadth of

human experience,

characteristics vary by situations.
and

habits

of

human

Since she represents

beings ... and

her

relevant

She knows the "qualities
the

characteristics

and

capacities of things and forces which are common knowledge at
the time and in the particular community ... [as well as]

the

24

common law, legislative enactments and general customs ... "that
are likely to affect the conduct of others ...
parties. 53

However,

her

primary

11

including third

consideration

always

whether her actions will impose injury on another (s) .
other words,

is
In

she weighs the "foreseeability of the risk of

injury" which may arise from her action.
Just as all negligence does not impose liability,

all

acts which involve risk of harm are not necessarily so laden
with danger that

they must be avoided.

Therefore before

acting, this reasonable teacher balances the usefulness of her
activity against its potential to harm and the extent of the
possible risk of harm to another. Obviously, this reasonable
person is a fictitious ideal who always makes good choices in
her conduct.
Court review of cases involving negligence considers the
actions of both parties but sets the standard of reasonable
care to protect the student(s) bringing suit, not the school
employee(s) against whom allegations are raised. The conduct
of the student(s) bringing suit is assessed in terms of the
standard

of

care

one

is

required

to

exhibit

to

protect

oneself.

The acts of the school employee(s) alleged to have

breached a duty of care are assessed in terms of a reasonable
teacher

53

290.

who

is

reasonably

considerate

of

the

safety

of

Restatement Second of Torts, secs. 285, 288C, 288C(a),

25

students. 54
When a student under the age of 16 years is a party to a
negligence
applies.
a

action,

the

reasonable

person

standard· still

Here the conduct of the minor is compared to that of

reasonable

experience

person

acting

of

the

under

like

same

age,

intelligence

circumstances.

The

and

child's

judgement is not questioned because judgement is an exercise
of

intelligence;

it

is

not

synonymous

with

intelligence.

Sometimes a young child may escape liability for negligent
acts because the law requires a young child to conform to the
standard of the reasonable person only when the risk inherent
in

the

act

and

the

injurious

character

identifiable by a child of the same age,

of

the

act

are

intelligence,

and

experience. 55
Where adult students with mental deficiencies or physical
disabilities are concerned,
the circumstance.

these conditions become part of

Thus the conduct of adult students with

mental deficiencies or physical disabilities is compared to
the conduct of reasonable adult persons in the same physical
or mental circumstances,
experience.

of

similar age,

intelligence and

Also when a person voluntarily assists another,

the person providing the voluntary assistance is bound to
exercise the same degree of care that our reasonable person in

54

Id. secs. 283(f), 291, 293.

55

Id. secs. 283A, 284(b).

26

the same circumstance would exhibit. 56

Awareness

of

the

attributes of the reasonable person, a person of similar age,
intelligence,

experience and circumstance,

raises the next

question: How is the conduct standard of this fictitious ideal
determined?
The minimum standard of conduct for a reasonable person
is

determined

in

four

ways.

First,

specific

statutes,

legislative mandates or administrative rules provide for the
standard.

Second,

when the established standard can't be

applied to the facts of a case, courts adopt the standard from
enactments or regulations which do not provide for one. Third,
appellate decisions establish the standard.

Finally, where no

standard exists, a trial judge or jury creates a standard to
apply to the facts of a case because a conclusion was reached
that a duty ought to exist under the circumstances.
Should a situation arise where a reasonable person would
take

additional

precautions,

compliance

with

existing

statutes, enactments, or regulations will not bar a finding of
negligence because these enumerate only a minimum standard of
reasonable
discoverable

care. 57
facts

expressions that,

Remember,
of

"legal

nature [.

They

duties
are]

in cases of a particular type,

56

Id. secs. 283B, 283C.

57

Id. secs. 285, 285(d), 288C, 288C(a).

are

not

conclusory
liability

27
should be imposed for damages done.
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Selected Legal Cases Involving Negligence
Now let's take a closer look at negligence in the context
of educational institutions. In most elementary and secondary
school

cases,

duty

is

premised

on

the

fact

that

school

officials acting "in loco parentis" possess full knowledge of
their students' needs for protection.

However, teachers of

adult students don't stand "in loco parentis!"

Furthermore,

public school personnel engaged in teaching or supervisory
activities usually are entitled to tort liability immunity.
However,

teacher

necessarily

apply

immunity
in

for

tort

liability

vocational-technical

a

may

not

school

district. 59 The following cases illustrate various negligence
claims

against

schools

or

school

personnel

arising

from

student injuries which occurred in vocational programs which
could be classified as service-learning programs.
In a 1990 New York case,

a court found for the school

when a learning disabled 19-year-old student was injured while
working with lumber under the direct supervision of a company
to which he had been assigned for work-study.

He severed two

fingers and injured a third while working with a saw with
which he was familiar. The school asserted no duty to control

58

Tarasoff v. The Regents of
California, 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal.1976)
59

See 78A C.J.S.sec.470.

the

University

of

28
the acts of the student because the student was a legal adult
and also because his mother, not the school, had encouraged
his participation in the program. The trial court ruled that
schools are not insurers of student safety, that the standard
of

reasonable

care

for

a

19-year-old

student

was

less

demanding than the standard for a young child, and that there
was no evidence that the machinery the student was using was
Therefore, the school was not negligent. 60

unsafe.

In another instance, a high school student enrolled in a
Missouri vocational agricultural class sustained injuries when
a nail struck him in the eye while he and fellow classmates
were constructing a hard oak feed bin as part of a curriculum
proj ect 61 •

The student was not wearing safety glasses;

and

the injury caused permanent loss of normal vision. On the day
of

the

injury,

the

school

district

had secured liability

insurance covering at least a portion of the damages.

The

trial court granted summary judgment to the school board, the
district and its named employees.
A unanimous appellate court affirmed the decision with
respect

to

the

school

board.

It

noted

that

in Missouri,

"purchase of liability insurance does not estop a
district]

from

asserting

the

defense

° Kennedy v. Waterville Cent.Dist.,
(Sup .1990) .
6

61

of

[school

sovereign

555 N.Y.S.2d 224

Lehman v. Wansing, 624 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.bane 1981).
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immunity.
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However,

where a student avers that the school

employees

district

named

in

his

were

suit

"acting

individually ... ," 63 the student may be trying to establish a
cause of action for tortious conduct against each of the named
parties. Therefore, "the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment [for the employees] based on sovereign immunity.

As

the liability of each [employee] will depend on the degree of
care each owes in the fact situation alleged, the [students]
may be able to plead the breach of personal duty as to each
[employee] in [the wrongful actions or omissions of actions]
averred.

"6

4

Furthermore,

the

court

indicated

decision that in situations like this,

in

a

split

a student should be

given an opportunity to state his precise claim against the
school officials named in the suit.

The judgment favoring the

superintendent, principal, di vision supervisor and teacher was
reversed and remanded.
In

a

similar

fact

situation,

a

high

school

senior

enrolled in the second semester of a building trades class was
injured as he attempted to hammer a nail
plywood while on a

into a piece of

house construction site. 65

He was not

wearing safety glasses at the time of injury; and the teacher

62

Id. at 2 citing Spearman v. University City Public
School District, 617 S.W.2d 68, 69-70 (Mo.1981).
63

Id.

64

Id. at 3.

65

Regulski v. Murphy, 326 N.W.2d 528 (Mich.App.)
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left the students unsupervised at the job site for a short
duration.

The

building

project

was

part

of

the

school

curriculum; and when completed, it was to be sold to a private
party.

Although the student alleged causes of carelessness,

wrongdoing,

and

unsupervised

and

accident,

negligence
failing

to

leaving

in

dismiss

students

the

students

after

the

the trial court granted summary judgment for the

school district finding that conducting the class was part of
the curriculum thereby entitling the district to governmental
immunity.

Furthermore, as district employees, the teacher and

the supervisor, also, were entitled to governmental immunity.
On appeal the question for the court, whether granting of
summary

judgment

to

the

school

district was

correct,

was

affirmed based on case law, statutory law, and analogy to the
case

which

established

the

law. 66

Resolution

affirming

summary judgment for the teacher and supervisor was achieved
by

reviewing

relevant

case

law

which

indicates

that

in

Michigan when teachers are engaged in teaching which is part
of the curriculum,

they are functioning in a governmental

capacity and therefore entitled to governmental immunity for
66

Id. at 52 9 citing Weaver v. Duff Norton Co. , 115
Mich.App. 286, 320 N.W.2d 248 (1982) which found "that a
public school district's operation of a vocational education
program is a governmental function within the meaning of
M.C.L.sec.
691.1407
and
M.S.A.sec.
3.996(107),
the
governmental immunity statute" and based its holding on
Sec.1287(1)
of
the
School
Code
of
1976,
M.C.L.sec.
380.1287(1); M.S.A.sec.15.41287(1) which authorize school
boards to establish vocational education programs and that
vocational education is an integral part of the modern
curriculum.
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tort liability.
The student appealed; and the case was reviewed by the
Michigan

Supreme

Court

as

part

of

a

consolidated

suit 67

examining the extent of immunity from tort liability to be
provided to the state and its agencies,
agents,

local governmental

agencies,

and the officers,

and employees of these

agencies.

As a result of this review, it was determined:

(1)

that since the purpose of the class was primarily educational,
the operation of the building trades class did not expose the
school

district

injury;
proper

(2)

to

tort

liability

for

the

student's

eye

that since the class was expressly authorized,

instruction and supervision of

students,

including

provision of proper safety instruction, equipment and measures
for

the

protection of

the

students

were

also

authorized

expressly or impliedly, and since the employees were engaged
in

a

governmental

occurred,

function

(teaching)

when

the

accident

the district was entitled to immunity from tort

liability;

( 3)

that

the

method

of

daily

instruction

and

supervision of students, being non-discretionary, exposed the
teacher and program supervisor to tort liability for their
alleged negligence in instructing, warning and supervising the
student who was injured;

(4) that determination of a school

policy

eye

for

protective

wear,

first-aid,

etc.

were

"discretionary-decisional" acts for which the persons making

67

See

(Mich .1984) .

Ross v.

Consumers

Power Co. ,

363

N.W.2d

641

32
decisions

were

immune

from

tort

liability;

and

( 5)

that

failure to comply with school safety policies and statutory
safety requirements for students in industrial arts classes
exposed the teacher and program director to tort liability
because compliance activities were ministerial functions, not
discretionary acts.
The above cases indicate that school districts and school
administrators are exempt

from tort

liability for acts of

policy determination such as protective eye wear policies.
However, when teachers do not enforce school district safety
policies,

they may lose their statutorily granted immunity.

Additionally, they may be liable for breach of statutory duty
if the policy flows from a state mandate.
Further clarification of the reasonable person standard
results from the holding in Payne v. Dept. of Human Resources,
382 S.E.2d 449
education
provided a

(N.C.App.

1989)

in which a deaf vocational

student

enrolled

in

a

residential

school

handbook

to

shop

students

school
brought

which
suit

against a teacher for negligent supervision when the student's
injury occurred partially due to insubordination.

First the

court determined that imposing a duty on a teacher to foresee
that a student in this circumstance would leave his assignment
when the teacher is summoned to another area for a brief time
would impose a burden on the teacher beyond that of reasonable
foreseeability.
68

68

Second, a teacher's duty to warn a student

Id. at 452.
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about dangers is not so expansive as to require that warnings
be given about any and all dangers that might arise in the
situation. 69 This requirement,

too,

would extend beyond the

standard of reasonable foreseeability. Finally, students are
responsible to know the safety rules and warnings included in
a school handbook. 70
In an Ohio high school vocational construction class,
students cut a

hole

in the floor of

a

dining room as part of a class project.
the day,

community member's
When class ended for

the hole was covered with insulating paper and "a

bookcase, table, and two chairs were placed by the two exposed
sides

of

the

hole.
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Despite

these

precautions

and

a

warning by the class instructor, the owner of the home fell
through the hole into the basement where she was found.

Later

that night she died.
The trial court granted the teacher immunity under Ohio
R.C.

2744.03 (A) (6)

which

provides

immunity

for

political

subdivision employees. However, the daughter of the decedent
appealed based on the exception in R.C. 2744.03 (A) (6) (b) which
does not grant immunity if the employee's "acts or omissions
were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or

69

Id. at 453.

70

Id.

71

Hackathorne v.
App.9 Dist. 1995)

Preisse,

661 N.E.2d 384,

385

(Ohio

34

reckless manner." 72 Although the teacher did not abide by the
applicable building codes, which the family of the decedent
thought should have been done, the appellate court based the
determination on foreseeability and ruled that in light of the
other precautions taken the teacher's conduct did not rise to
the level of maliciousness,

wantonness or recklessness.

He

further noted that even though the parties differed in their
views of the level of the teacher's fault, assignment of the
level of culpability is a legal conclusion for the court to
determine, not a statement of fact to be presented by either
of the parties.

Roberts

v.

Robertson

County

Board

of

Education73

provided an extended explanation of duty in an educational
setting.

In defining duty under Tennessee law,

the court

noted that teachers and school districts are not insurers of
students; and teachers are not expected to supervise students
in all their activities at all times. Furthermore, the court
noted that in other jurisdictions where injuries to students
in shop classes were considered,

"teachers, and through them

their local school systems, are required to exercise such care
as ordinarily reasonable and prudent persons would exercise
under the same or similar circumstances." [citations omitted]
Furthermore the reasonable person standard adopted in
other Tennessee cases involving safety relates the standard to
72

Id. at 386.

73

692 S.W.2d 870
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the nature of the person to whom duty is owed and the context
in which the duty arises. 74

Acting upon these precedents,

the court ruled that a "high school vocational teacher has the
duty to take those precautions that any ordinarily reasonable
and prudent person would take to protect his shop students
from the unreasonable risk of injury.

The extent of these

precautions must be determined with reference to the age and
inexperience of the students involved, their less than mature
judgment with regard

to

their conduct

and the

inherently

dangerous nature of the power driven equipment available for
their use in the shop.

In order to discharge this duty, it is

incumbent upon a teacher, at minimum, to instruct his students
in the safe and proper use of the equipment,

to warn the

students of known dangers, and to supervise the students to
the extent necessary for the enforcement of adequate rules of
shop safety.

11

Quoting from the Supreme Court of Tennessee, proximate
cause is

"an act or omission occurring or concurring with

another which,

if it had not happened, the injury would not

have been inflicted."

It does not have to be the sole or last

cause for the injury, and there can be more than one cause for
an

injury.

74

It

is

also

possible

to

recover

from

multiple

Roberts, 692 S.W.2d at 870 citing Hawkins County v.
Davis, 216 Tenn. 262, 267,
391 S.W.2d 658, 660 (1965) and
Townsley v. Yellow cab Co., 145 Tenn.App. 425,m 454-455, 222
S.W.2d 854, 867 (1968).
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parties separately or jointly. 75
In Illinois it has been established that a shop teacher's
control

over his

students

is not

the

same as

that

in an

When a decedent student's

employer-employee relationship.

estate brought an appeal based on respondeat superior76 ,

the

appellate

the

court

indicated

that

the

difference

relationship was sufficient for the appeal to fail.

in

For the

suit to have succeeded, the actions of the teacher would have
to have been wilful or wanton.
Since

the

claim

against

the

district

alleged

only

incompetence or failure to act, the lower court had properly
dismissed

the

suit

in

which

death

resulted

from

an

unauthorized student being thrown to the pavement while riding
the hood of a car being driven through the school parking lot
at high speed.

The student driver's counter suit alleging

contribution by the school district was also dismissed. 77
Compare the

above decision to this one

individuals perished in,

or as a

result of,

in which two
a

fire which

originated in a defective electrical cord on a window air
conditioner.

75

The air conditioner had been purchased from a

Id.

76

Respondea t superior is a "common law doctrine which
holds the master or principal liable for the employee's or
agent's" reasonable and foreseeable actions (including torts)
that an employee "engages in while carrying out the employer's
business." (Black's Law Dictionary, Pocket Edition 1996 at 546
and 564)
77

Knapp v. Hill, 627 N.E.2d 1068 (Ill.App.1st Dist.1995)
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student at a postsecondary area vocational technical school.
The trial court granted a judgment favoring the school and
against the family survivors, the building management company,
and its insurer.
A

building

conditioners

The parties appealed.
manager

could

be

technical school.

advised

purchased

his
at

tenants

the

area

that

air

vocational

The students at the school repaired air

conditioners as part of a class.

The air conditioners were

brought to the school by students or donated by others. The
unit alleged to have caused the fire was purchased at the
school from the student owner who had been working on it the
time of purchase.

At the time of installation the cord of the

unit had been taped and spliced.

However,

there were no

apparent problems for several months and there was no evidence
that

the

resulting

electrical cord.

problems

were

related

to

the

spliced

Under Louisiana Civil Code Articles,

the

question on appeal was inter alia whether the school is liable
to the survivors,
insurers. 78

the building management company and its

Since the other counts are beyond the scope of

this paper, they will not be discussed.
Testimony indicated that the school had a known policy
against selling appliances at the school. Students could sell
repaired items from their homes, but not from the school. The
school also had an expressed policy against the use of spliced

78

Levine v. Live Oak Masonic Housing, Inc. 491 So.2d 489
(La.App.3 Cir. 1986).
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electrical cords. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2320, provides
in pertinent part:
" ... Teachers and artisans are answerable for the damage
caused by their scholars or apprentices, while under
their superintendence.
In the above cases, responsibility only attaches when the
masters,or employers, teachers, and artisans, might have
prevented the act which caused the damage, and have not
done it."
Therefore, for the instructor and school to be liable, it must
be established that the instructor could have prevented the
act which caused the damage if he had exercised proper care
under the circumstances;

that he failed to exercise proper

care; that damage occurred; and that the damage was caused by
the instructor's improper exercise of care.
The appellate court reasoned that since the students were
mature young men, both over 18 years, they should have been
able to follow instructions given to them by the instructor
without

the

instructor's

direct

supervision.

Since

the

student who sold the air conditioner deliberately violated two
school policies, both without the knowledge of the instructor,
the instructor was free of negligence and no school liability
resulting from the instructor's conduct existed. 79
The above cases applying the various principles of the
law of negligence suggest that school administrators may be
liable for negligent supervision if it can be shown that they
failed

79

to

exercise

Id. at 494.

reasonable

care

in

overseeing

the

39
development, design, and administration of a school's servicelearning

curriculum

personnel

with

or

in

supervising

responsibility

for

faculty
academic

and

other

programs.

Inadequate supervision of students also may expose vocational
However,

education administrators to tort liability.

such

liability may be highly subjective and limited by narrowly
defined scope of applicable duties.
Because teachers are nearest to students in the chain of
liability, they may have the greatest legal responsibility for
accidents that occur to students while they are involved in
activities
educational

to which the

teachers

are

assigned.

Even when

institutions and their officials are not

held

liable, teachers may be liable for accidents which result from
teacher negligence.
the

actual

liability
80

medical
imposed

Resulting damages many times greater than
costs
on

may be

teachers; 80

awarded
and

when

as

a

result

of

constitutional

See McKnight v. City of Philadelphia, 445 A. 2d 778
(Pa. Super. 1982) in which a trial court's $95,000 award to
a student whose one finger was amputated and another severely
injured while using a saw without a guard was affirmed by the
appellate court which indicated that proximate cause, the
point where legal responsibility attaches for harm to a
student resulting from acts of a teacher, may be established
by evidence that the teacher's negligent act or failure to act
was a substantial factor, not the only factor, in causing harm
to the student and that testimony by the principal who at the
time of the accident was an administrative assistant to the
superintendent that he knew and recognized the responsibility
of the principal for the safety of the students and under
ordinary circumstances everything else in the building was
sufficient to establish that the principal's failure to
correct the situation constituted negligence; see also Cotton
v.
Gering Pub.
Schools,
511 N.W.
2d 549
(Neb.
App.
1993) (affirming a $32,000 award for damages to a student whose
medical bills amounted to less than 10% of the award.)
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torts against teachers are not proven,

the teacher may be

granted summary judgement and entitled to recover all court
costs from the student plaintiff. 81

Legal Principles Derived From Selected Cases
In the cases reviewed above, most reached the appellate
level because the lower courts had granted summary judgment
for schools

The

and their employees.

immunity from tort

liability at the district level generally was premised in
statutory laws designed to minimize fear of litigation for
personnel

charged

However,

when

an

with

policy-making

administrator

responsibilities.

violated

school

safety

policies, the court recognized this violation of policy and
found

the

administrator

negligent

for

not

correcting

a

dangerous situation which he knew about or should have known
about. 82
An appellate court is likely to affirm a trial court's
decision

against

unreasonable

risk

a

teacher when
of

injury. 83

a

student

Teachers

is

are

exposed to
expected

to

81

See Moore v. Port Arthur Independent School Dist., 751
F. Supp. 671 (E.D.Tex. 1990).
82

83

See McKnight, supra note 65 and accompanying text.

See Barbin on Behalf of Barbin v. State, 506 So. 2d
888 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987)awarding a deaf minor in a special
placement who uses manual communication $185,00 in damages as
a result of the physical and emotional harm sustained by
cutting his right index finger longitudinally from the tip
into the proximal interphalangeal joint while participating in
a class under the supervision of a teacher who argued that the
(continued ... )

41
foresee the danger in selecting activities.

They also are

expected to modify the course curriculum and exclude use of
dangerous equipment when the school district does not repair
or replace the defective equipment.
When an adult student brings a negligence claim against
a teacher, the court's analysis places less emphasis on the
conduct of the teacher and increases scrutiny of the student's
action.
high

Age of the student, not location of the program in a

school

factor.

or

postsecondary

school,

is

a

determining

84

Where contribution is a factor in the decisions, holdings
vary.

For example, in North Carolina, if evidence indicates

beyond a doubt that a student contributed to his own injury,
a

nonsuit

may

be

declared. 85

Some

courts

may

reduce

a

student's award in proportion to his contribution to his own
injury, 86 and a Louisiana court may use the student's age as
83

( • • • continued)
student's momentary inattention contributed to the student's
injury and therefor the teacher should not be considered
negligent; the case also considers the fault of the state in
strict liability as custodian of defective things and
indemnity of the teacher and the insurance company, all of
which are beyond the scope of this paper.
84

Contrast Levine, supra note 63 (discussing an adult
student in a postsecondary program) with Kennedy, supra note
45 (discussing a 19-year-old student enrolled in a high school
program) and accompanying texts.
85

See Izard by Izard v. Hickory City Schools Board of
Educ., 315 S.E.2d 756 (N.C.App. 1984).
86

See Higgins v. East Valley School Dist. 704 P.2d 630
(Wash.App.1985); Cotton v. Gering Pub. Schools, 511 N.W.2d 549
(continued ... )
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a determining factor for contribution. 87

Also, apportionment

of student negligence is not appropriate when the teacher and
the school district are found not guilty. 88
While

each

of

the

states

presents

a

unique

set

of

circumstances related to vocational education which qualifies
as

service-learning,

some general

agreement

on principles

emerges: (1) Determination of teacher negligence, the level of
culpability, and whether contribution was present and to what
degree are generally questions for juries, not matters of law
for judges to decide. ( 2) Courts distinguish between liability
based on negligence and liability based on maintenance of
86

( • • • continued)
(Neb.App.1993); see also Marcantel v. Allen Parish School Bd.,
490 So. 2d 1162 (La .App. 3d Cir .1986) discussing contribution by
students participating in a makeshift football game.

87

Barbin on Behalf of Barbin v. State, 506 So.2d 888,
(La.App. 1 Cir. 1987).
88

See Fontenot v. State through Dept. of Educ., 635 So.
2d 627 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994) in which a severe hand
laceration to a student in a special education class did not
create liability for the teacher even though the student
charged the teacher with two counts of wilful negligence and
quoting at 628 from Prier v. Horace Mann Insurance Co., 351
So.2d 265 (La. App. 3d Cir.) writ denied, 352 So. 2d 1042,
1045 (La. 1977) "[s]chool teachers charged with the duty of
superintending children in the school must exercise reasonable
supervision over them, commensurate with the age ... and the
attendant circumstances.
A greater degree of care must be
exercised if the student is required to use or to come in
contact with an inherently dangerous object, or to engage in
an activity where it is reasonably foreseeable that an
accident or injury may occur. The teacher is not liable
... unless it is shown that ... might have prevented the act
which caused the damage, and did not do so.
It is also
essential to recovery that there be proof of negligence in
failing to provide the required supervision and proof of a
causal connection between the lack of supervision and its
accident ... (citations omitted)."
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defective equipment.

( 3)

The

II

in loco parent is II

status of

elementary and secondary school teachers in most states acts
as

a

shield in

claims

of

ordinary negligence.

( 4)

Where

injured students prove teachers or other school employees'
acts

were wilful,

wanton,

or reckless,

statutory bars

immunity from tort liability generally will not apply.

to
( 5)

Vicarious liability based on a master-servant relationship
usually does not apply in the student-teacher relationship.
(6) A state code granting immunity from tort to teachers does
not bar a tort claim under the due process clause of the
U.S.Constitution.

(7) Purchase of liability insurance by an

educational institution does not necessarily estop it from a
plea of sovereign or governmental immunity where statutory
entitlement exists.
Usually,
tort. 89
plea

by

negligence

is

considered

an

unintentional

At the university level, this opens the door for a
the

university

of

not

guilty

based

on

lack

of

scienter. This could excuse the case against the university
even though duty is the

issue.

However,

if negligence

is

redefined as failure to meet an acceptable standard of care,
then intentional and unintentional torts would be included. 90
This could provide enhanced protection for students without
jeopardizing

the

89

position

of

educational

institutions.

Drushal, supra note 2, at 619 n.62 relating the tort
of negligence to the student as consumer.
90

Id. at 619.
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Furthermore,

an

institution

could

not

be

liable

if

its

standards were equal to or exceeded those of like institutions
in similar circumstances.

School Codes
In

Illinois,

student

teachers,

teachers

and

other

specifically enumerated classes of school-related personnel
are

explicitly

covered

under

105

ILCS

5/10.20.20

which

protects them from suit. When acting within the regular scope
of their authority as vested in them by the school board
through the building principal and the cooperating classroom
teacher,
others.

student

teachers

cannot

be

sued

for

injuries

to

However, the statute dictates a loss of immunity from

suit in cases where injury arises from acts or omissions of
acts which are deemed wilful and wanton.

While in the past,

wilful and wanton action was the equivalent of an intentional
tort, in modern Illinois case law

wilful and wanton action is

a point on the continuum between unintentional and intentional
tort but tending to weigh closer to an intentional tortious
act or omission.
Illinois Boards of Education also are charged with the
responsibility to purchase liability insurance and include
student

teachers

in those covered under the policy.

The

policy protects against any loss or liability arising out of
civil rights claims and suits,
and suits,

constitutional rights claims

and death and bodily injury and property damage

45

claims and suits.

This insurance may cover the costs for

defenses when damages are sought for acts which are alleged to
be negligent or wrongful and are committed within the scope of
employment or under the direction of the school board.

The

insurer must be licensed to write school liability coverage
within this state

(105 ILCS 5/10.22.3)

Note that in this

section of the code the language implies that student teachers
are either employees or performing functions as authorized by
the school board.

A literal construction of the language in

this section suggests student teachers may be employees or
actors under the direction of the board,

but they are not

simultaneously employees and actors under the direction of the
board.

Generally,

the

student

teacher's

presence

in

an

Illinois school is authorized by the board but supervision and
control

of

teaching

activities

occur

at

the

building

level.
When adult students are injured or cause injury to third
parties or to property while participating in school-related
events

that

involve

complex relationships,

court

analyses

focus on education law in conjunction with other areas of law.
If

the

student

is

classified

as

a

service-learner,

the

student's role as learner or employee isn't always defined
under the law.

Therefore the laws of labor may need to be

considered.

Federal Labor Laws

46
Most of the statutory framework of American labor law
which includes the child labor laws,

legislation regulating

the workplace and legislation seeking to protect workers'
interests,

emerged during the first

half of the twentieth

century. 91

Today's law of the workplace is implemented under

the general framework of federal labor statutes and the more
specific labor statutes which vary from state to state. 92
The federal statutory framework was established under the
Fair Labor Standards Act
Black stated that the

(FLSA) .

In Walling,

93

Mr.

Justice

"Fair Labor Standards Act fixes the

minimum wage that employers must pay [my emphasis] employees
who work in activities covered by the Act ... [I]n determining
who

are

'employees'

under

the

Act,

common

law

employee

categories or employer-employee classifications under other
statutes are not of controlling significance." 94

While the

Act does not expressly include or exclude students or persons
working without expectation of compensation,

"· .. there is no

indication from the legislation ... that Congress intended to
outlaw

such

relationships

as

these. " 95

While

schools,

91

Michael B. Goldstein and Peter Wolk, Legal Rights and
Obligations of Students, Employees, and Institutions in K.G.
Ryder, Education in a New Era: Understanding and Strengthening
the Links Between College and the Workplace 169 (1987).
92

Id.

93

Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150
(Oct.Term 1947).
94

Walling, 330 U.S. 148, 150.

95

Id. 330 U.S. 148, 152.

47
colleges,

and

universities

are

covered under

the

Act,

96

" ... work experience programs that are closely related to a
student's

academic

program

and

are

conducted

under

the

auspices of an educational institution would not ordinarily
fall within the Fair Labor Standards Act, absent extenuating
circumstances.

1197

Although the FLSA has generated much litigation, no clear
definition

of

emerged. 98

However,

volunteer

into

identified. 99

the

an

employer-employee
five

criteria

employee

under

which
the

relationship
may

has

transform a

FLSA

have

been

These include:

(1)

Receiving payment (monetary or in-kind)

(2)

Providing a service which competes with or forces
displacement of a worker;

(3)

Volunteering to one's employer if the voluntary
task is equivalent to the work performed during the
regular employment period;

96

Goldstein,

supra note 43.

97

Letter to Ms. Louise Wasson of Seattle Public Schools
from Michael Goldstein of Dow, Lohnes & Albertson 3 (January
29, 1985) on file with the National Society for Experiential
Education [copy on file with author].
98

Arnold Rehmann, Legal Issues in Experience-Based Career
Education (research report submitted to the Career Education
Program, National Institute of Education,
(Pursuant to
Contract OEC-0-72-5240) May 1, 1974 and reprinted with
permission of Aries Corporation,
4930 W 77th Street,
Minneapolis, Minnesota) at 52 indicating that Goldberg v. Wade
Lahan Construction Co., 290 F.2d 408 (1961) cites 30 Supreme
Court cases dealing with the definition of the employeremployee relationship.
99

Suzanne Tufts, Charles Tremper, Anna Seidman, and
Jeffrey Kahn, Legal Barriers to Volunteer Service, (Nonprofit
Risk Management Center, 1994) 4.

48
(4)

Earning a livelihood from the organization
which the volunteer service is performed;

(5)

Doing work which benefits the organization .itself
rather than the stated recipients of the volunteer
assignment. 100

Generally,

the

for

FLSA does not apply to persons working to

accomplish "public service, religious, or humanitarian " goals
if their donated services are not causing the displacement of
workers. 101
However,

it has been established that what constitutes

work is a question of law; 102 and all who provide services
are

not

necessarily

employees. 103

When

determining

the

existence of an employer-employee relationship, the power to
control a service provider's conduct is considered the most
significant element . 104

If the existence of an employment

100

Id. noting that these criteria were developed by
interpreting multiple Labor Department documents; see also
Michael B. Goldstein, Legal Issues in Combining Service and
Learning in Jane C. Kendall and Associates, Combining Service
and Learning: A Resource Book for Community and Public
Service, Volume II (1990) stating that "the Fair Labor
Standards Act implies that one cannot [be employed without
being paid for the work] but the decisions remain unclear."
101

Tufts et al., supra note 47, at 5.

102

Amicus brief for petitioner, Tennessee C. I. & R. Co.
v. Muscoda, 88 L. Ed. 949, 951b; but see Justice Roberts'
dissent stating " ... what Congress meant by work was ... the
actual service rendered to the employer for which he pays
wages in conformity to custom or agreement" at 962a.
103

United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 712 (1947); 91
L.Ed. 1757, 1767b.
104

See NLRB v. Hearst Pub.,Inc., 88 L. Ed. 1170 (1944)
at 1173a (defining terms in accordance with the National Labor
(continued ... )

49
relationship is determined by the National Labor Relations
Board (N.L.R.B.), this determination is regarded as conclusive
when

supported

by

the

evidence; 105

case

law

defines

the

employment relationship under the FLSA and the Social Security
Act. 106
Under the Wage-Hour Administrative Ruling WH- 70,

a

multipart test is used to determine whether work an intern
performs constitutes employment under the FLSA. 107
the

conditions

of

the

test

are

satisfied,

an

If all
academic

104

( • • • continued)
Relations Act); Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, (1947)
at 127a (stating" ... person having the right of control over
the services to be rendered is the employer of those over whom
he has such right of control, and it is entirely immaterial
and irrelevant whether or not he exercises that control");
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947) at 712 (indicating
that absence of an expressly reserved right of control in a
single feature [of the work] may become the criterion for
deciding who is the employer) ; Rutherford Food Corp. v.
McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (for the statutory definitions of
employer and employee for the FLSA and also indicating that
determination of an employment relationship depends on the
whole activity and not isolated factors); Goldstein, supra
note 43, at 172.
105

See N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publishing, Inc.
322 U.S.
111, 131 (stating that the role of the courts is limited when
an agency has the duty of initial review); 88 L.Ed. 1170,
1170b, 1180b (indicating that N.L.R.B. decisions do not depend
on state law to determine existence of employer-employee
relationships).
106

107

Rehmann, supra note 48, at 51 - 54.

Letter to Ms Wasson, supra note 47, at 2 (indicating
that primary benefit of work performed must flow to the
student; that work must be under the auspices
[e.g.,
protection or patronage according to Webster's Dictionary] of
the educational institution;
that compensation was not a
consideration at the inception of the internship; that no
anticipation of regular employment existed at the completion
of the program. )

50
internship is exempted from the FLSA coverage because the
primary benefit of the experience flows
When a

to the student . 108

court emphasizes the value of the training as the

benefit

flowing

to

the

student,

a

situation analogous

to

traditional forms of compensation may be created and thus
establish an employment relationship. 109
there

is a possibility that

learning

situations

who

are

students

Also,

in one state

in experienced-based

reimbursed

for

out-of-pocket

expenses could be considered employees.no

Workers' Compensation Rules
Determination of status as an employee is critical for
receipt of workmen's compensation which provides financial
assistance to an employee who sustains a work-related injury,
regardless of the cause of the injury.n 1
or salary status is not

108

However, employee

the only requisite condition for

Id. at 2; see also note 48, 50 and accompanying text.

109

See infra note 61 discussing appellate decision in
Barragan v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd, 240 Cal, Rptr.
811 (1987); see also Rehmann, supra note 46, at 69.

no
Whitepaper from Off ice of Experiential Education,
University of Kentucky, Kentucky Workmen's Compensation and
Experiential Learning Situations, (May 6, 1974).
n1
Michael B. Goldstein, Liability for Volunteers'
Injuries, Synergist 42 - 44 (Winter 1979) indicating workmen's
compensation is a form of statutory insurance paid for by an
employer and provides recovery for medical costs and lost
earnings resulting from injury due to employee's own or
employer's negligence.

51
entitlement to compensation. 112

Sometimes,

if an employment

relationship can be determined, a volunteer, as an employee,
may be protected under workmen's compensation. 113
participating

in

the

University

of

Kentucky

Students

Experiential

Education Program possess statutory entitlement to the state
compensation
injury. 114

program

This

if

they

"no-fault-type"

incur

a

placement-related

insurance

exists

in every

state, but the workers covered under the law vary. 115
Under

the

pertinent

paragraphs

of

Compensation Act of Illinois (820 ILCS 305/1)

112

the

Worker's

"employer" and

Rehmann, supra note 46, at 76.

113

See Barragan v. Worker's Compensation Board 240 Cal.
Rptr. 811
(1987) where a student in a degree-required
internship was injured during the course of performing service
and was refused compensation by the hospital because she was
not an employee; where the determination was overturned by the
California Court of Appeals which found four reasons that
entitled the student intern to compensation: (1) an employeremployee relationship was created when the student performed
a service (assisting patients) and was rewarded by the
hospital
(receiving training and instruction);
(2)
the
hospital directed all her service and accorded her the same
treatment as all other employees;
( 3) no exclusions for
students were included in the states worker's compensation
statute; (4) the student was not a true volunteer because the
internship was a degree requirement; see also Goldstein, supra
note 59, at 43c; Tufts et al., supra note 48 at 4.
114

Under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 342. 640 everyone
who is under an express or implied contract of hire is an
employee except those specifically exempted under KRS 342. 650.
Kentucky students working out of state can collect in Kentucky
so long as the employment contract is made in Kentucky, and
the student can be classified as an employee in Kentucky; or
the student can also file in the employer's state.

115

Rehmann, supra note 46, at 76.

52

"employee" are defined as follows:
(a)

The term "employer" as used in this Act means:

1. The State and each county, city, town, township,
incorporated village, school district, body politic, or
municipal corporation therein.
2.
Every person,
firm,
public,
or private
corporation,
including
hospitals,
public
service,
eleemosynary, religious or charitable corporations or
associations who has any person in service or under any
contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written,
and who is engaged in any of the enterprises or
businesses enumerated in Section 3 of this Act, or who ...
has ....... elected to become
subject
to
the
provisions of this Act, and who has not, prior to such
accident, effected a withdrawal of such election in the
manner provided in this Act.
(b)

The term "employee" as used in this Act means:

1.
Every person in the service of the State,
including members of the General Assembly, members of the
Commerce
Commission,
members
of
the
Industrial
Commission, and all persons in the service of the
University of Illinois, county, including ... city, town,
township, incorporated village or school district, body
politic, or municipal corporation therein, whether by
election, under appointment or contract of hire, express
or implied, oral or written, ... and including any
official of the State, any county, city town, township,
incorporated village school district, body politic or
municipal corporation therein except ... is an employee
under this Act only with respect to claims brought under
paragraph (c) of Section (8).
One employed by a contractor who has contracted with
the State, or a county, city, town, township,incorporated
village, school district, body politic or municipal
corporation therein, through its representatives, is not
considered as an employee of the State, county, city,
town, township, incorporated village, school district,
body politic or municipal corporation which made the
contract.
2.
Every person in the service of another under
any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or
written, including persons whose employment is outside of
the State of Illinois where the contract of hire is made
within the State of Illinois, persons whose employment
results in fatal or non-fatal injuries within the State
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of Illinois where the contract of hire is made outside of
the State of Illinois, and persons whose employment is
principally localized within the State of Illinois,
regardless of the place of the accident or the. place
where the contract of hire was made, and including
aliens, and minors who, for the purposes of this Act are
considered the same and have the same powers to contract,
receive payments and give quittances therefor (sic), as
adult employees.
Determination of
state

worker's

"employee"

status

sufficient

compensation benefits

must

be

to

activate

resolved by

reference to the history and fundamental purposes of the act
not simply the technical contractual or common law conceptions
of employment. 116

The following cases should clarify this

point.
A student at the University of Illinois was partially
paralyzed

due

to

sustained

making

spinal
a

fire

gymnasium swimming pool. 117

cord
dive

or
at

nervous
a

water

system
circus

injury
in

the

The student filed a claim under

the Workmen's Compensation Act against the University's Board
of

Trustees

and

corporations. 118
Commission

116

The

dismissed

the

Athletic

hearing
the

officer
petition

Association,
for

the
for

both

Industrial
want

of

82 Am Jur 2d, sec. 143

117

Athletic Association of the University of Illinois v.
Industrial Commission, 384 Ill. 208.
118

Record by Petitioners at 244, Athletic Association of
the University of Illinois v. Industrial Commission 384 Ill.
208 (Sup.Ct., January Term, A.D. 1943) (No. 27032).
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jurisdiction. 119
On appeal to the Industrial Commission a certified copy
of the Athletic Association charter was
evidence.

included with the

Based on the evidence presented to the arbitrator,

including the certified copy of the organization's charter,
the Industrial Commission entered a determination in the form
of

monetary compensation for

reviewed

by

the

Circuit

Court

decision

of

the

Industrial

the
on

student.

The

case

was

and

the

approved

and

certiorari, 120

Commission

was

confirmed.
The

opinion

relationship

of

between

the
the

circuit

court,

University

Association and concluded that

focused

and

the evidence

the

on

the

Athletic

indicated the

Association existed as an "entirely independent corporation"
chartered

under

the

nonprofit

statutes

of

the

state . 121

Furthermore, since Association funds were held solely in the
name of the Association and not the University, a judgement
against the Association would not "control the action of the
State or subject it to liability." 122

Finally, citing to 16

C.J.S. 374, 375 and McDermott v. A.B.C. Oil Burner Sales Corp,

119

Id. accepting the opinion of University counsel that
the Association was an agency of the University which was an
arm of the State which claims were to be heard by the Courts
of Claims.
120

Id. at 245.

121

Record, supra note 67, at 251.

122

Id. at 252.
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266

Ill.App.

115,

121
is

"Association

the

only

opinion

liable

for

concluded
its

own

that

acts

the

and

a

judgement against it has no legal effect whatever against the
University. " 123
After resolving the issue of the Athletic Association's
relationship

to

the

University,

the

employer-employee

relationship was analyzed in terms of the Association charter,
organizational insurance for employee injury, and the status
of the petitioner (student). Then referring to the Workmen's
Compensation Act in force at the time of litigation, citing
supporting case law and providing a lengthy discussion of the
relationships of the parties, the opinion concludes:
petitioner is an employee;

(2)

(1) that

that the Association controls

the activity; and (3) that the activity fell under the usual
course of trade or business of the Association. 124
Illinois Statutes 125 and case
123

Id.

124

Id. at 254 - 269.

law126 this

Under

is an appropriate

125

Ill. Bar R.S. 1941, Ch. 48, Sec. 156 (f)
states:
"The decision of the industrial commission acting within its
powers ... shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive unless
reviewed as in this paragraph hereinafter provided. "
The
following section says: "(1). The Circuit Court ... shall by
writ of certiorari to the Industrial Commission have power to
review all questions of law and fact presented by such
record."
See Brief for Respondent at 49, Athletic Association
of the University of Illinois v. Industrial Commission, 384
Ill. 208 discussing Parker-Washington Co. v. Industrial Board,
274 Ill. 498, 501-02, 113 N.E. 976, 978 (stating that the
Circuit and Supreme courts can only review questions of law
(continued ... )
u

6
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outcome.

However,

the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the

decision on a writ of error and reversed the award.
This court determined that the analysis of the lower
courts created a strained construction of the term 'employee'
for purposes of the Act.

The court distinguished between

liberal construction and a strained construction designed to
extend the scope of the Act to employments or occupations not
fairly within the Act.

The principle of law then is that the

term "employee" must be construed to reflect the legislative
intent of the Act.
Nearly 30 years later, in The Board of Education of the
City

of

Chicago

v.

Industrial

Commission

et

al., 127

the

Supreme Court of Illinois held that where the 100 hours of
clinical observation performed by an education student were a
university

requirement

which

students

were

expected

to

complete in the course of their training, a student who was
injured in the course of completing these hours was not an
126

( • • • continued)
when reviewing proceedings of the Industrial Commission and if
the evidence supports the decision of the commission, it is
out of the province of the courts to comment upon the weight
or the sufficiency of the evidence); quoting Chicago & Midland
Ry. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 362 Ill. 257. 261, 199 N.E.
828, 830(stating that the Supreme Court has a duty to consider
the evidence; will not substitute its judgement for that of
the Industrial Commission especially where the decision of the
Commission has received the endorsement of the circuit court
unless the judgement is clearly and manifestly against the
weight of the evidence); and Perkins Products Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 379 Ill. 115, 117, 39 N.E. (2d) 372,
373(quoting Chief Justice Smith to the same effect).

127

53 Ill.2d 167, 290 N.E. 2d 247.
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'employee' of the Chicago Board of Education and therefore not
entitled

to

receive

compensation

for

the

injuries

sustained when she fell down the stairs. 128
position,

she

To support its

the court referred to the social policy involved

stating that the purpose of compensation in this state and
others is to restore lost wages
power

is

interrupted

injuries

arising

employment.

11129

out
Also

or

II

for workers whose earning

terminated

of
that

and

in

as
the

throughout

a

consequence

course
the

of

of

their

country

the

interpretations involving compensation laws have uniformly
excluded

gratuitous

workers

from

coverage . 130

Receipt

of

wages is a determining factor for entitlement to workers'
compensation benefits.
A third Illinois case, an appeal from the decision of the
circuit court,

serves to emphasize the need for assent to

employment

the

by

parties

as

a

condition

compensation for a job-related injury.

for

receiving

This claimant applied

for compensation benefits for injuries sustained in a fall
while supervising lunchroom activities. For this service she

128

Chgo Bd. of Ed. v. Industrial Com. 53 Ill.2d 167

129

Id. at 1 71 citing to Coclasure v. Industrial Com.
(1958), 14 Ill.2d 455; Lambert v. Industrial Com. (1952), 411
Ill. 593) .
130

Id. at 1 71 citing to discussion and cases in lA A.
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law (1967), sec. 47 .10 et seq.;
99 C.J.S., Workmen's Compensation, sec. 64; but see Orphant v.
St. Louis State Hospital (Mo.1969), 441 S.W. 2d 355 where the
statute embodied contrary legislative intent.
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received $52 per month from the school PTA. 131

Claimant was

a volunteer in the school at other times of the day.

The

school principal attested to knowledge of the claimant's pay
from the PTA for lunchroom supervision services, that she and
the assistant principal supervised the claimant's work and
that she had the power to terminate claimant's services should
they prove unsatisfactory. The claimant was under the control
and

supervision

of

the

principal,

not

PTA. 132

the

Board

knowledge was immaterial because the principal as agent for
the Board was acting within the scope of her authority.
decision

of

compensation

the

circuit

benefits

was

court

denying

reversed

and

an

the

award

award

of

The
for
the

Commission reinstated.
The Supreme Court of Illinois distinguished the instant
case from the prior case on two counts:

(1) The Board offered

the education student no consideration for her services.

(2)

The student did not consider herself to be an employee, nor
did the Board consider her as a Board of Education employee
even though the principal directed and controlled the student
teacher's activities at the school.

The legal principle that

emerges is that students participating in curriculum-imposed
activities

and receiving no wages

131

for

their

services

are

The Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. The
Industrial Commission et al., 57 Ill. 2d 339, 312 N.E. 2d 244
(1974).
132

Id. at 245.
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volunteers, not employees based on Illinois law in 1972.
In the instant case,
school's

lunchroom

received a

a school volunteer acting as the

supervisor,

an

activity

monetary compensation,

capacity as

supervisor.

was

Citing its

for

which

an employee

she

in her

decision against

the

student claimant, the Illinois Supreme Court reiterated that
'it

is generally recognized that

a

true employer-employee

relationship does not exist in the absence of the payment or
expected payment of consideration in some form by employer to
employee.'

Although the payment was indirect

(The PTA paid

for the lunchroom supervisor's services), the Court cited its
holding in Forest Preserve District v. Industrial Com. (1934),
357 Ill.389,

192 N.E.342 which determined that an employer

need not pay an employee if the employer is aware that a third
party is paying the employee for the services performed for
the

employer. 133

It

also

quoted

from

lA A.Larson,

Law

of

Workmen's Compensation (1973), sec. 47.41n.1 cited in Forest
Preserve District, that 'so long as there is some kind of pay,

it

is

not

essential

that

the

payment

come

from

the

employer. ' 134
Authority supporting student teachers as employees is in
conflict.

In some states, student teachers who are injured in

the course of student teaching assignments may be employees of

133

Id. at 246.

134

Id.
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their colleges; 135 in other states, they may be employees of
the school districts to which they are assigned for purposes
of

worker's

compensation; 136

or

their

status

may

be

undefined.
Bringing

service-learners

within

the

meaning

of

"employee" under state workmen's compensation statutes may
result in a "win-win'' situation for both the student and the
organization which accepts the student. In the event of injury
to

the

student,

the

organization's

liability

is

limited

because a covered employee cannot sue for negligence except
under

limited

and

unusual

circumstances . 137

The

covered

employee who is injured usually receives remuneration for lost
compensation and/or medical costs. 138

Thus,

only those

in

limited and unusual circumstances or those not covered by
compensation statutes would be inclined to bring an action for
the tort of negligence against the organization which acts as

135

See School Dist. No. 60 v. Industrial Commission,
Colo .App., 601 P. 2d 651 where under Colorado statute the
student teacher was determined to be an 'employee' of the
state university which he attended and had been 'placed with
an employer' when he was assigned by the college to a public
school district and was injured when supervising playground
activities and therefore entitled compensation.
136

although

137

Supra note 73; see also Goldstein, supra note 59 at

138

Id.

Illinois and California in particular;
analogous situations may exist in other states
44a.
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an employer. 139
Decisions in other jurisdictions generally have affirmed
the

principles

presented

above.

Student

nurses

who

pay

tuition but are required to work regular shifts in addition to
attending classes and serve without pay under the direction of
the supervisory staff of the hospital while they are working
are employees within the compensation act when they receive
room

and

student

board which

nurse

trainees

represent
who

do

remuneration. 140
not

receive

wages

However,
of

some

statutorily acceptable form may not be employees as a matter
of law even where prejudicial authority recognizing training
and control as wages exists. 141

There is also authority to

139

Diane L. Banks,
Legal Issues in International
Cooperative Education, XXI Journal of Cooperative Education
3:34 - 35 (1985) noting also that domestic legal issues are
complicated
when
American
students
are
assigned
to
international cooperative education programs. Problems arising
include non-coverage under workmen's compensation programs,
compliance with governing statutes, labor laws, immigration
laws, and import-export laws of the respective countries as
well as the contractual issues between institutions or
students and landlords.
tto
In Re Brewer's Case, 141 N.E.2d 281; see also Caraway
Methodist Hospital v. Pitts, 57 So.2d 96, 100 for other cases
indicating that the relationship between a student nurse and
a hospital under a similar fact situation is that of employer
to employee .
141

Salvation Army v. Mathews, Ky. App 847 S.W.2d 751
(1993) where female enrolled in a school program leading to
licensure for practical nurses, paid the required tuition for
full-time study, and worked at a designated hospital, under
supervision of the teacher or person affiliated with the
nursing school, to fulfill the practical training requirement
sustained injuries as the result of a fall; where student
claim under the Kentucky Worker's Compensation Act was denied
based on her non-employee status and on appeal via memorandum
(continued ... )
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support the non-employee status of nurse's aide trainees who
receive uncompensated training in hospitals with no promise of
positions upon completion of the training . 142
While

the

job

status

of

apprentice

medical-related

personnel may be problematic and require determination on a
case by case basis, it is possible that these personnel may be
students for some purposes and employees for others. 143 Lab141

( • • • continued)
argued that she was an 'apprentice' under applicable statutes;
where review board responded that instant case which provided
no remuneration whereas cases brought in other health
facilities demonstrated receipt of some form of in-kind
compensation determined claimant to be a non-employee for
purposes
of
compensation;
where
claimant
appealed to
compensation board which cited Mississippi case law accepting
student nurse training as compensation based on statutes of
that state coupled with control exercised over clinical
training to qualify Mississippi student nurse for compensation
benefits and awarded benefits to Kentucky student stating that
training alone was sufficient under KRS 342.0011(17) to
qualify student nurse as employee for compensation benefits;
where hospital appealed decision based on definitions in state
compensation act indicating that wages were a critical factor
for determination of an employment relationship under Kentucky
statutes and court agreed indicating that under statutory
provision KRS342. 640
contracts for apprenticeships also
required remuneration to provide protection under compensation
statutes.

142

Henderson v. Jennie Edmundson Hospital, 178 N. W. 2d
429 (1970) where judge reviewing the industrial commissioner's
determination held that the evidence that trainee had received
neither compensation nor a promise of future employment was
sufficient to determine that trainee was not employee at time
of injury and affirmed denial of award.
143

See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center and Cedars-Sinai
Housestaff Association, 223 N.L.R.B. No.57 (March 19, 1976)
which is frequently cited for its determination that interns,
residents and clinical fellows are ''primarily students" and
therefore not employees subject to the N.L.R.A. collective
bargaining provision; but see an earlier case, City of Miami
(continued ... )
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technician trainees, one group of medical-related personnel,
may

be

services

apprentices
and

compensation

at

qualified
benefits

the
as
when

hospitals
employees
injured

where
of

in

the
the

they

provide

hospital
course

of

for
the

training. 144
There have also been claims that persons enrolled in
programs for medical-related personnel occupy a dual status,
simultaneous student-employee status . 145
enrolled

One such claimant

in an accredited nursing school

under

a

federal

3

( • • • continued)
v. Oates, 10 So.2d 721 (Dec. 1, 1942) which determined that a
hospital,
organized under
statute and operated by a
municipality, is liable for the negligent acts of an interne,
as it is for those of a nurse, under "respondeat superior"
because both are employees and that acts of negligence by a
nurse are answerable in damages.
~

144

Wilson Memorial Hospital, Inc., 226 S.E. 2d 225 where
a student attending a technical institute was assigned to a
cooperating hospital for on-the-job training as a labtechnician pursuant to a curriculum requirement received onsite training and free laundry service while working 40 hours
per week without wages and performed tests, analyses, and
procedures as a hospital agent as did full-time employees in
this department was determined to be an apprentice within the
meaning of the applicable North Carolina statute and providing
the clarification that the court found "these trainees not to
be primarily students, but rather to be apprentice employees
within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act"; and
noting that although the record indicates the trainees were
covered by the Act, the agreement between the school and the
hospital did not have a provision to effect the Act and the
agreement between the school and hospital did not contain a
provision for indemnification to secure the hospital against
loss or damage that could result from trainee injury.
145

See Anaheim General Hosp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. ,
83 Cal.Rptr. 495, 499 (Jan. 13,1970) citing Van Horn v.
Industrial Acc. Com., 219 Cal.App.2d 457, 33 Cal.Rptr. 169;
Union Lumber Co. v. Industrial Acc.Com.12 Cal.App.588, 594, 55
P. 2d 911; Hanna, California Law of Employee Injuries and
Workmen's Compensation [2d ed.] vol.2, sec. 5.01(2) (a).
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program which provided the claimant with tuition and a weekly
maintenance allowance and paid the school for each hour of
formal

instruction

it

provided

to

her . 146

One

of

the

requirements for licensure, clinical experience, could only be
attained in a hospital setting (Cal.Adm.Code, Title 16, sec.
2557) . 147

The

teacher

in

the

nursing

program

had

to

be

acceptable to the hospital and received her salary from the
hospital.
per

Additionally the hospital paid the school an hourly

student

hospital.

rate

for

time

spent

by

each

student

in

the

Daily training was 25% academic and 75% clinical.

Activities were commensurate with experience and progressed
from routine patient care to administration of medicine and
changing dressing.~ 8

146

Anaheim General Hosp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. , 83
Cal. Rptr. 495 (1970); but see Otten v. State et al., 40 N.W.
2d 81 (Dec.9, 1949) for an earlier case on appeal where a
student nurse at a state university taking courses under the
United States Cadet Nurses Corps program which covered
tuition, fees, and other expenses and received a monthly
stipend from the University and non-monetary compensation from
the affiliates where she received her clinical training
including the hospital where she contracted a disease causing
a disability and where the University maintained full control
over her on-campus program, assignments to clinical rotations
and her personal conduct and deportment was deemed an employee
of the state university at the onset of disease because
factors
considered
as
decisive
(hiring,
payment
of
compensation, the right to hire and fire, and the right to
control the means and manner of the performance of the work)
were all under the control of the university which never
relinquished control of supervision or assignment of rotations
to affiliate sites and as an employee of the university
claimant was entitled to recover compensation only from it.
147

Id. at 496,

148

Id. at 497.
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There was no evidence of a contract between the student
and the hospital.
the hospital.
hourly

rate

However, the claimant's services benefitted

Although no actual wages were received,
the

hospital

paid

to

"consideration in the form of the

the

school

the

represented

school's willingness to

accept her as a student despite the eventuality it might not
be paid for the full course by the government in the event she
dropped out.

"1

49

In its determination of whether a student who receives
on-the-job training is an employee of a 3rd party, the court
emphasized three findings.

(1)

Valid consideration for an

employment contract existed because the hospital benefitted
from the services of the student and because of the conditions
under which the hospital paid the school for the attendance of
each student trainee.

(2) The hospital maintained exclusive

control and direction over the work the student performed
including the teacher which the school provided.

(3) Because

the hospital had complete control over the work including the
supervision

of

the

teacher,

the

court

inf erred

that

the

student could be terminated for infraction of its rules or
unsatisfactory service. As a result of these findings,

the

court held that an implied contract of employment existed and
that the dual status of student-employee at time of injury
entitled the student nurse to compensation benefits. The court
also opined that for worker's compensation benefits,
149

Id.

it is

66

better

to

view

student

teachers

and

student

nurses

as

volunteers

as

employees . 150

Volunteers
Service-learners
vulnerability
states. 151

to

In

classified

lawsuits

in

approximately

limited

Illinois

half

retain
of

liability

volunteer

the
is

extended for service provided for any corporation which is
organized under the Illinois Nonprofit Corporations Act and
which qualifies for tax exemption under Internal Revenue Code,
sec.

50l(c) (3).

Usually

coverage

applies

to

charitable

organizations or to other groups which include homeowners'
associations,

licensed

medical

facilities,

and

other

organizations that would be tax exempt but for legislative or
political activities . 152
statute.

Exceptions

are

enumerated in the

To bring suit for a cause of action, the involved

conduct must be wilful and wanton; and

persons bringing suit

must be serving without compensation other than for actual
[author's emphasis] expenses. 153
Under provisions of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, 745

150

Id. at 298.

151

Nonprofit Risk Management Center, Two Paths to
Volunteer Protection, 4 Community Risk Management & Insurance
9 (September 1995).
152

805
(Smith-Hurd)
153

Id.

Illinois

Compiled Statutes

( ILCS)

105/108.70

67

ILCS 80/1 (Smith-Hurd), sports volunteers may be compensated
for reasonable expenses; and umpires or referees are allowed
to accept a modest honorarium. While the statute lists persons
covered and the parameters of their participation, there is no
protection

from

civil

liability;

and

conduct

falling

"substantially below" accepted practice and standards is not
protected.

Other exclusions are enumerated.

Volunteers providing medical services in medical clinics
must be licensed to practice the treatment of humans in any
state or territory of the United States.

They,

like most

other volunteers, must be uncompensated and are not protected
from

civil

limitations

liability.
of

As

liability

a

point

of

distinction,

the

for volunteers providing medical

services apply only if they are posted in the free medical
clinic.

Other exclusions and conditions exist . 154

Because their roles are not clearly defined under the
law,

students who at tempt

to

recover damages

under state

compensation statutes for injuries sustained in the course of
participation in university events may find themselves
uncertain and complex legal arenas.

154

225 ILCS 60/31 (Smith-Hurd).

in

CHAPTER IV
MANDATORY COMMUNITY SERVICE IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS
USA

Today,

September

15,

1993,

reported

that

polls

indicate in excess of 60% of American youth ages twelve to
seventeen years engage

in volunteer work. 155

While

it

is

unclear whether or not these figures represent the growing
number of school districts which require mandatory community
service, it should be noted that at the present time at least
seventeen states have some type of youth service policy for
high school students. 156

In several school districts

155

Schools Shouldn't Force Community Service, USA Today,
Sept.15, 1993, at A12.
156

See Nancy Murphy, European Council of International
Schools, 1996 Autumn Conference, Nice, France, listing 14
states and the District of Columbia [Arkansas Act 648 (1993);
California Community Service Pilot Projects legislation
passed, but appropriations denied (1990) and Challenge School
District Initiative (1996) requiring that by 2004 all high
school students will participate in at least one course
service-learning course before graduation from high school;
Connecticut (1988);
District of Columbia;
Hawaii (1996);
Kentucky links service-learning to state education reform
(1990); Maryland requires community service for graduation
from all public high schools (1992);
Massachusetts (1994);
Minnesota (1987, 1993); Ohio House Bill 396 (1992); Oklahoma
Senate Bill 680 allows school districts to award credit for
community service (1992);
Oregon HB 3293 authorized the
Department of Education to create community service programs
(1989);
Pennsylvania (1993); South Carolina (1994); Utah
(1988)];
see also Eastern Regional Information Center,
Implementing Community Service in K-12 Schools: A Report on
Policies and Practices in the Eastern Region (June 1997) which
(continued ... )
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mandatory community service policies have been instituted. 157
Opponents

of

the

service-learning

requirement

challenged its constitutionality on three grounds.

have
First,

required community service infringes on expressive conduct as
proscribed under the First Amendment.

Second, compelled free

service

involuntary

violates

protection

against

guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment.

Third,

servitude
parents'

rights to control the education of their children as secured
under the Fourteenth Amendment are usurped.

Proponents of the

requirement usually cite policy or altruistic reasons . 158
At this time, no service-learning suit has been litigated
in Illinois or in the Seventh Judicial Circuit.

However,

recent decisions in cases from other jurisdictions, although
not establishing precedent, create persuasive authority for
156

( • • • continued)
identifies the states of South Carolina, New Hampshire and
Vermont.
157

N. Murphy,
Resource Sheet: Mandatory Service,
European Council of International Schools,
1996 Autumn
Conference, Nice, France reports the following although others
may exist:
Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania; Atlanta, Georgia;
Chatham, Georgia; Canaw County, West Virginia; Mason City,
West
Virginia;
Chapel
Hill-Carrboro,
North
Carolina;
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan; Rye High School, Rye, New York;
Detroit Public Schools, Detroit, Michigan; District of
Columbia, Washington, D. C,; Westchester County, New York;
Raleigh, North Carolina; Dade County (Miami), Florida; San
Antonio, Texas; Corpus Christi, Texas; Cincinnati, Ohio; and
Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.
158

Examples of reasons for service-learning or community
service requirements for graduation include active involvement
in
learning,
excellent
preparation
for
responsible
citizenship, a need for exposure to service so that students
will not neglect it later in life, to instill a positive
feeling about service to others, etc.
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the analyses that may be shaping the development of legal
theories related to service-learning in secondary and lower
schools.
The earliest on-point case in the secondary schools is
Steirer

v.

Bethlehem

raises two issues.

Area

School

District. 159

This

case

First it considers whether a requirement

that students perform community service to be entitled to
graduate

from

high

school

compels

students

to

engage

in

expressive conduct that infringes on their First Amendment
freedom.

Next, it seeks to determine whether the requirement

constitutes "involuntary servitude" which is forbidden under
the Thirteenth Amendment.
In

Steirer

the

public

school

district

adopted

a

graduation requirement that all high school students, except
those enrolled in special education classes,
sixty hours

of

unpaid community service.

must complete
Students

provide services in one of three programs:
operated

by

a

school-district-approved

( 1)

agency;

could

a program
(2)

an

independent program selected by the school district; or (3) an
independent program or "experiential activity" designed by the
student

and

approved

by

appropriate

school

officials. 160

Although no classroom instruction or discussion was involved,
credit was awarded; and any student not completing the program
159

789 F.Supp. 1337 (E.D.Pa. 1992), aff'd., 987 F.2d 989
(3d Cir.) ,cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 85 (1993). The facts were
never disputed.
160

789 F. Supp.1337 (E.D. PA. 1992)
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satisfactorily would not receive a diploma from a district
high school.
Two students and their parents brought suit in the United
States District Court challenging the constitutionality of the
program

and

seeking

a

permanent

injunction 161

against

enforcement of the

community service requirement

for high

school graduation.

The district court found for the school

district on all counts.
In 1995,

parents and students in the Rye Neck School

District of New York brought suit against the district on
grounds of violation of parent rights,

student liberty and

student privacy, and Thirteenth Amendment challenges.
Steirer as precedent,

Using

this court also found for the school

district. 162
More recently, parents and students in the Chapel HillCarrboro City School District brought an action challenging
completion of the district's community service requirement in
order to graduate. 163

Beginning with the graduating class of

1997, students in the Chapel Hill-Carrboro School System are
required to complete fifty

(50)

hours of unpaid community

service for high school credit while attending in order to be
161

A permanent injunction is a court order which is
granted after a final hearing on the merits. See Black at 316
indicating that a permanent injunction does not last forever.
162

Immediato v. Rye Neck School District, 873 F. Supp.
846 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
163

See Herndon by Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro, 89 F.
3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996).
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eligible for graduation;

service hours for transferees are

prorated. The program permits neither an opt-out provision nor
a

credit

substitution

for

objectors.

Additionally,

the

service must be performed on the students' own time.
Minimally, two types of service are required and hours
spent performing clerical work or fund raising are limited.
A program coordinator maintains a list of approved placements
reflecting a wide variety of purposes and philosophies.
coordinator also may approve any placement
appearing on the approved list.

The

selections not

However, the principal is the

final decision-maker.
Acceptable contexts for the service are delineated in the
program description.

The external agencies for which students

provide services are responsible for training, supervision and
verification of

service hours.

Students must

submit

the

verified time sheets and a one-to-two-page reflective paper
based on

journal

responses

written

after

Hill

Carrboro

each particular

service experience.
Parents

in

the

Chapel

the

community

service

School

objected

to

reasons:

(1) It violates the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition

against involuntary servitude.

(2)

requirement

System

for

three

It violates the parents'

right to direct the education of their children as secured
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
freedom

from

compulsory

(3) It is an infringement of

service

guaranteed

under

the

substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The

decision

of

district on all

the

district

court

favoring

three counts was upheld at

the

school

the appellate

level.
A

strained

interpretation

of

Constitutional

issues

surfaces from a careful reading of the Steirer, Rye-Neck, and
Chapel

Hill

cases

cited

above.

The

holdings

should

be

grounded in solid legal reasoning. Instead they rely heavily
on policy considerations which lack objective bases. 164
164

The

In Steirer the court did not even consider the
possibility that the required community service could be
considered expressive conduct even though plaintiffs provided
examples of similar conduct in Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633
(1943) and Wooley, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) and similar cases
where the acts were declared violative by the Supreme Court.
By summarily concluding no involvement of expressive conduct
present in required community service and ignoring even the
possibility of involvement of expressive conduct the court
avoided analysis of compelling affirmation which determination
would have forced the court to find a sufficiently important
governmental interest to justify even an incidental limitation
of students' free speech rights guaranteed under the First
Amendment. Hence the courts' deference based on a public
policy attitude that all school programs compel submission to
some value-based judgements and that value-based judgements in
all programs are similar emerges as persuasive even though
this
conclusion is based on an
incomplete argument.
Furthermore, no rationale exists for the inconsistencies in
the supporting examples (health education and substance abuse
education) which include a classroom component with no active
participation and the community service program which involves
active participation with no classroom component. Which begs
the question, 11 Is a credit program involving no classroom
component truly part of the curriculum or is it a mandatory
extra-curricular requirement (clearly an oxymoron) for which
credit has been designated as a justification for curricular
status which public policy exempts from serious court
scrutiny? 11
The holding is premised on the validity of the
defendants comparison of the community service requirement to
selective service, jury duty, and alternative sentencing
programs for criminal offenses.
In each of those instances,
there is a recognized civic duty involved. Do students have a
civic duty which compels them to perform altruistic and self(continued ... )
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decisions in these cases, which challenged required servicelearning programs

in

lower schools,

reflect

a

pattern of

deference to school discretion which Ray, Bickel and Dodd each
identified in the resolution of issues emanating from contract
disputes in higher education, institution over individual . 165
Earlier

it

institutional

was

noted

duties

Dodd

students

to

expectations of duty as a
student challenges

that

espouses

balancing

against

students'

means to determine outcomes of

in higher education contract suits.

In

cases emanating from challenges in lower schools, the parents
usually request the courts to balance the important parental
liberty to control the education of their off-spring
parents

expect

of

state

education)

against

the

(what

state's

interest in educating for responsible citizenship (the state's
duty

to

educate)

166

In

the

Steirer decision,

the

court

circumvented its opportunity to establish the parameters 167
164

( • • • continued)
sacrificing acts?
And if they do, would omission of these
acts justify a school district from withholding a high-school
diploma if all other graduation requirements are successfully
completed and no alternative to the service requirement is
provided?

165

Ray, supra note 1 7 at 163; Bickel, supra note 22 at
261; and Dodd, supra note 1 at 710.
166

Brief for Appellants at 149, Herndon, et al., v.
Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir.
1996) (No. 95-2525).
167

Steirer, 987 F.2d 989 (3rd Cir. 1993) at 997 stating
"[h]aving decided that the Program does not compel expression
protected by the First Amendment, it is unnecessary to
(continued ... )
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for determining issues which seem to conflict with parents'
rights

educate

to

as

guaranteed

under

the

Fourteenth

Amendment.
At all levels of education,

court decisions involving

students and schools usually express a reluctance to interfere
with the administration of schools.
is limited.

However, this deference

Schools generally are endowed with discretion in

curricular

matters

but

possess

activities outside of school.
where students are minors . 168

much
This

less

authority

over

is especially evident

Recall that in Herndon,

the

service was to be performed on the students' own time with no
classroom component.
The mandatory community service requirement also has been
challenged as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment which
prohibits

involuntary

servitude.

The

arguments

for

and

against this position center on interpretations of the phrase
"involuntary servitude."
requirement

Proponents of the service-learning

for graduation

insist

that

the

intent of

the

167

( • • • continued)
consider whether the state has a compelling interest in
implementing
a
mandatory community
service
graduation
requirement"
and affirming summary
judgement
for
the
defendants that the mandatory community service requirement
did not infringe on the First Amendment rights of students to
expressive conduct nor did it infringe on the Fourteenth
Amendment rights of parents to control and direct the
education of their children.
168

See E. Edmund Reutter, Jr. 760 (1994) stating that
"it is ... legally more difficult to enforce a rule of conduct
outside of school than inside because of potential conflicts
with the rights of parents ... "
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Thirteenth

Amendment

understanding

of

the

prohibition
terms

encompasses

whereas

opponents

broad

a

of

the

requirement restrict the meaning of the terms to acts akin to
slavery. The language of the Amendment itself empowers courts
to interpret "involuntary servitude" as compelled service for
which no pay is rendered . 169
Furthermore in the Steirer decision, the court determined
that although students who resist completion of the servicelearning requirement are denied the right to graduate from a
public high school,

no coercion results because there are

other alternatives available for completion of a high school

169

The Thirteenth Amendment reads as follows:
"Section
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
punishment for crime whereof the parties shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2 - Congress shall
have the power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation."
Careful analysis of the language in the opening phrase of
Section 1 indicates that the drafters of the Amendment by
their inclusion of the word nor between slavery and
involuntary intended to distinguish between slavery and other
forms of involuntary servitude. Slavery references people held
in bondage as chattel whereas involuntary servitude alludes to
people not owned but forced to perform service against their
will. This broader interpretation is supported in Bailey v.
Alabama,
219 U.S.
240
(1911) (stating that
[t]he words
involuntary servitude have a larger meaning than slavery);
U.S. v. Booker, 655 F. 2d 562 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that
[t]he Amendment and the legislation were intended to eradicate
not merely the formal system of slavery ... but all forms of
compulsory involuntary service) ;United States v. Mussry, 726
F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that the design of this
Amendment and the statutes which enforce it are not limited to
the classic form of slavery but apply to various circumstances
and conditions).
1.

-

77

education. 170

The

court

also

held

that

since

no

party

disputed the presence of educational value in the community
service requirement, authority to remove the requirement rests
with the state legislature rather than the judiciary. 171
those

opposing

the

community

service

requirement,

To
this

appellate court holding represents yet another example of
court deference to institutions.
The

Supreme

Court

decisions

consistently

have

recognized education as an important right of parents and as

170

Steirer, 789 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D.Pa.1992) (citing to
persuasive reasoning in Bobilin v. Board of Education, State
of Hawaii, 403 F.Supp. 1095) at 1344 - 1346.
171

Steirer, 987 F.2d 998 - 1000 (3rd Cir. 1993) (noting
that although it does not regard the district court reasoning
in Bobilin as persuasive, it [the Third Circuit court of
Appeals]
is "unprepared ... at this time,
to accept the
proposition that the Thirteenth Amendment is inapplicable
merely because the mandatory service requirement provides a
public benefit by saving the taxpayers money" and therefore
postpones the public benefit argument choosing instead to
emulate the contextual analysis in Supreme Court decisions
which demonstrate that the critical factor in finding
involuntary servitude is "that the victim's only choice is
between performing the labor on the one hand and physical
and/or legal sanctions on the other" and that even this choice
at times does not constitute involuntary servitude as in the
instances where government requires established civic duties
such as military duty,jury duty, and road building with legal
sanctions imposed for failure to comply; and embellishing this
analysis with modern day examples of involuntary servitude and
with non-examples of involuntary servitude which include a
state requirement of pro bono service from attorneys as a
condition of licensure, similar pro bono circumstances in
medical fields, and work-release program participation for
prisoners; and finally stating that an alternative need not be
appealing; it must merely exist for choice to be present.) In
effect, the Court of Appeals, by not addressing the argument
on the grounds presented by appellant, also circumvents the
issue.
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an

essential

citizenry.

concern of
However,

the

the

state

Court

to

has

insure
never

an

educated

recognized

a

fundamental right of parents to have their children exempt
from a state educational requirement on secular grounds. 172
Yet this is the very issue that parents raise when requesting
that

their

offspring

be

excused

from

mandatory

service

requirements. As noted earlier, this also is the very issue
that

the

decisions

analysis

in Steirer avoided.

concerning

mandatory

Yet

service

the

use

subsequent
Steirer

as

persuasive authority.

172

See Arie Herndon, et al. v. Chapel Hill Carrboro City
Board of Education, et al., Brief of Appellees, United States
Court of Appeals 4th Cir. Record No. 95-2525 citing Runyon v.
Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (explaining that the Supreme
Court "has repeatedly stressed that ... [parents] have no
constitutional right to provide their children with
education unfettered by reasonable government regulation");
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 213 (1972) (stating that [t]here
is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high
responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education");

CHAPTER V
INSURANCE, WAIVERS, AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk managers recommend verification of site insurance
before placing a student at an off-campus site for schoolrelated experiences.

When a school signs an indemnification

agreement 173 that passes responsibility for negligence from
the agency hosting service-learners to the school which sends
the

service-learners,

the

educational

institution must

be

certain that its insurance carrier will honor the transfer of
liability.
in

the

Not clearing this transfer of liability may result

school

bearing

responsibility

without

insurance

coverage . 174
When the indemnification agreement is reversed so that
the responsibility passes from the school to the receiving
agency, the school still must be wary. If an agency has little
or no insurance, the educational institution which placed the

173

BLACK
defines an indemnity agreement as an
arrangement to compensate for a loss, damage or liability; for
purposes of insurance law this is the principle that the
insurance policy should not confer a benefit greater in value
than the loss sustained by the insured. In the case of
service-learning programs, indemnity insurance would be an
institution's policy that applies to the institution itself or
the property belonging to the institution.
174

The Campus Compact Newsletter, v4 n4, Spring/Summer

1990 at 3.
79

80

student still may be sued under the deep pockets theory. 175
However,

if the agency in question is a public agency,

it

usually is protected from suit by law.
For students placed in international service-learning
programs,

Although the U.S.

insurance also is recommended.

Code 1961 places responsibility for insuring students in these
programs on the administering program, the Mutual Security Act
of

1954 which provides

protection

for

students

for
in

the programs does not provide
international

service-learning

placements . 176
When students in international service-learning programs
attempt to make claims,

if the insured student is the same

nationality as the insurer, the claim is handled as a domestic
claim under domestic law.
governed

by

However, rules of nationality are

international

law . 177

For

American

abroad disposition of this problem is a concern.

students
However,

Meron reports that international interest in the problem is
limited to double claims . 178
Schools

which

are

non-profits

organizations

must

be

175

A legal theory of recovery; a party or entity with
substantial assets against which a claim or judgement may be
taken, like an insurance company, even though that party or
entity is not responsible for the harm.
176

L.Diane Banks,
Legal Issues in
Cooperative Education, XXI Jrnl Coop Ed 3:36.
177

178

International

Id.

T. Meron,
The
International Claims Law,"
628 - 646.

Insurer and the Insured Under
Am Jrnl Intern'l L XVIII (1974)
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especially careful of situations in which service-learners may
be inclined to transport community members by car.

Even when

the student is classified as a volunteer, not an employee, the
institution can be sued if the driver is found to be negligent
or to have caused damage to property while providing service.
In such an instance, a court will be have to determine if the
school had the right to control the student driver, even if
the right had never been exercised. 179

This may result in an

insurance problem.
According to the September 1995 issue of Community Risk
Management & Insurance, in such an instance, a "yes" reply to

any one of the following questions may be sufficient evidence
of the school's right of control of an activity:
what entity decided to conduct the activity?
entity planned the scope of the activity?

(2)
(3)

entity asked the particular student to drive?

(6)

Who or what
Who or what
(4)

driver's performance supervised by the school?
driving necessary?

(1) Who or

Was the

(5) Was the

Could the driving have been assigned

to someone else?
Additionally, questions related to scope of employment
may

also

be

used

to

determine

the

extent

of

a

school's

liability for the acts of a driver who is a service-learner.
These questions would include the relationship of the activity
to the mission of the school, the regularity with which the
activity occurred,
179

whether driving was permitted under the

See supra n170.
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policies

and

procedures

of

the

service-learning

whether the school authorized the driving,

program,

and whether the

driving was related to or incidental to the normal duties of
the service-learner.
Although not a legal case premised on service-learning,
the principles from

Baxter v Morningside, Inc. (Wash App) 521

P2d 946, 82 ALR3d 1206 clearly illustrate how an organization
can be vicariously liable for the acts of its service-learners
who are classified as volunteers.

In this case a volunteer

"expressed a willingness to run errands and perform other
tasks

as

a

volunteer,

availability." 180

contingent

upon

need

and

his

Morningside, Inc. accepted the volunteer's

offer and on several occasions solicited and accepted the
driver's

gratuitous

services.

Because Morningside,

Inc.

called and requested the driver's assistance on the morning of
the accident in question, and because the court determined the
accident was caused by the negligence of the volunteer driver,
Morningside' s

right

to

control

the work of

the

volunteer

driver was examined.
This court examined the "effect of volunteer status upon
the

existence

of

the

master-servant

relationship"

and

determined that status as a volunteer "does not necessarily
preclude

a

existed. " 181

finding
The

that

court

a

found

180

Baxter, 82 ALR3d 1209

181

Id. at 1210.

master-servant
that

when

relationship

there

is

mutual

83

agreement controlling time,

destination,

trip,

for

requisite

present. 182
existed;

conditions

Therefore,

a

the

and purpose of a

right

of

master-servant

control

are

relationship

the volunteer driver was acting within the scope of

a master-servant relationship;

and

Morningside,

Inc.

was

vicariously liable for the acts of its volunteer driver.
If driving is required as part of a service-learning
placement, the school should define whether and what type of
driving is within the scope of the service-learner's position.
The

educational

institution should also

delineate

who

is

authorized to drive, the type of vehicle that is to be used,
and for what the service-learner is allowed to drive.

Clear

guidelines for driving will limit organizational liability
should an accident occur.
While

some

institutions

may

be

inclined

to

require

waivers from service-learners, some discourage use of waivers
for institutional protection.

Disagreement arises because

waivers cannot release a school from liability for its own
negligence.

Waivers

only

will

protect

the

educational

institution when the risks students incur are reasonable and
foreseeable and not caused by institutional negligence.
A waiver

is

a

signed

document

indicating

that

the

sponsoring entity will not be held responsible in case of
injury or damage during an activity or event.

Where children

are the litigants, courts are almost unanimous in holding that
182

Id. at 1211.
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waivers do not release schools from liability for injury or
damages which the school could have prevented during an event
Courts

or activity in which the student was a participant.

hold that parents or guardians cannot sign away a child's
right to sue for future injury.
However,

when

adults

are

participants,

interpreted waivers in different ways.
proprietary school,

courts

have

In a case involving a

a federal court ruled that the release

signed by a patron of a beauty school was an enforceable
contract,
right

and adults have the right to contract away their

to

sue

others

for

negligence . 183

But

case

law

involving the use of waivers by colleges and universities has
met

with

judicial

disapproval.

The

arguments

for

this

position are premised on the public policy position that
acceptance of waivers creates a potential to allow future
negligent

acts

by

encouraging

acceptance

of

faulty

precautionary measures which would contribute to injuries and
damage.
In a
University,

1981 case involving the dental school at Emory
a

dental student broke a patient's

jaw.

The

patient sued and the university claimed no responsibility
because the patient had signed a release which the university
termed

II

informed consent.

11

Because those supervising the

activities of the dental student,

183

See Popovich v.
F.Supp. 1440 (1983).

who for purposes of this

Empire Beauty Schools,

Inc.,

567

85

paper is considered a service-learner, are professional under
the laws of the State of Georgia, the Supreme Court of that
state

ruled

that

"informed consent"

a

written

contract,

even

though

termed

does not and cannot excuse professionals

from the standard of care owed to their clients. 184
Other cases exist indicating that for release forms to be
valid,

the

language and circumstance must

reveal that the

parties clearly understand the definition and extent of the
liability

that

is

being

waived.

While

differing

court

opinions on waivers exist, they still may be valuable in some
circumstances.

These signed documents serve as an advance

warning to participants of inherent danger in an activity or
event.

Thus they may be used to argue that adults voluntarily

assumed the specified risk.

These forms also may discourage

some injured parties from instituting suits against schools or
be used by the schools to show that adequate warning was
provided.
When students are placed off-campus for service-learning
experiences, schools are wise to negotiate for supervision by
the staff of the host site.

Generally speaking, the school's

duty to care or protect increases in direct proportion to the
degree of supervision provided.

Inspection is one way to

evaluate risks at an off-campus placement site.

However, on-

site inspection programs can raise legal questions as the

184

See Emory University v. Porubiansky, 282 S.E.2d 903.
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following
issue

case,

concerns

"unique
a

in

Law" 185

U.S.

coordinator's

illustrates.

responsibility

The

during

a

cooperative education placement, a form of service-learning,
According to the facts of this case, an engineering aide
working in a foundry was injured in an industrial accident and
subsequently hospitalized.
second-year

mechanical

cooperative assignment.
the

student

University.

changed
However,

At the time of injury, he was a

engineering

student

on

his

first

Following release from the hospital,
majors

and

graduated

from

Drexel

at the time of the court case he had

made no attempt at securing employment citing psychological
impairments,

physical

limitations

and

physical

pain

as

reasons; he lived with his parents and had not participated in
State-offered job training rehabilitation programs.
According to testimony, the purpose of the program was to
provide students with practical experience related to their
educational
program

studies.

related

The

school

literature,

and

provided
the

site

the

site

informed

with
the

university coordinator of the number of openings but not the
specific openings.

The university coordinator usually made

two trips to the site.

One was to discuss ways in which the

foundry and the student might receive maximum benefit from the
cooperative education program.

185

The university coordinator

Stewart B. Collins, Arthur Montano, & Paul M. Pratt,
Wuerffel vs. Drexel University:
Limits of a Coordinator's
Responsibility For the Student's Work Environment, VXV Jrnl
Coop Educ 2:15, winter 1978-79.
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made no inquiries related to dangers at the job site,

and

training

the

and

supervision

were

the

responsibility

of

foundry.
Expert testimony regarding the university coordinator's
role was divided.

If the placement was an internship, then

the university which placed the student would have direct
supervisory obligations.
experience,

supervision

If
and

the placement was
direction

by

the

for workemployer

necessarily would exceed that which normally characterizes
student-teacher relationships . 186
Counsel

for

the

university argued that

there was

no

causal relationship between the alleged breach of duty on the
part of the university and the accident which involved the
engineering student.

A unanimous jury found the university

and its cooperative education coordinator were not negligent
and that no breach of contract occurred between the university
and the student.
decision

might

According to one commentator, a contrary
have

caused

educational

institutions

to

reconsider commitments to work-experience programs. 187
The cases cited above suggest that school administrator
fears of litigation involving service-learning programs may be
unfounded.

Most institutions granting diplomas or degrees

have had extensive experience placing students in work-study,
cooperative education, and internship-type programs which are
186

Id. at 21.

187

Id. at 22.
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required

for

program

These

completion.

programs

have

established procedures for insurance coverage, transportation
agreements,

and

placement-site

insurance

coverage.

Some

institutions which offer service-learning options or mandates
have

already

tapped

into

existing

insurance

programs

to

provide coverage for all students participating in courserelated

service-learning programs.

Schools

that

plan

to

incorporate service-learning into their curricula may be able
to use policies and procedures that are already in place.
The

key

concern

for

schools

which

are

reluctant

to

incorporate service-learning into their curricula is the risk
of liability for negligence.

As indicated earlier, negligence

charges against education institutions generally arise from
lack

of

or

improper

supervision.

These

concerns

can

be

minimized by implementing policies and procedures that reduce
risks

and

exposure

to

dangers.

For

example,

preparing

handbooks which clearly state the responsibilities and rights
of all parties; requiring documented training of personnel;
providing

consistent

supervision

of

participants;

and

evaluating personnel.
The

threat

of

lawsuits

for

organizations

which

have

chosen to mandate service-learning is certainly an Achilles
heel.
in

Charges of negligence are of primary concern.

1975,

the

National

Association

of

Secondary

However,
School

Principals outlined some principles for school administrators
to abide by if they are to avoid involvement in a suit for

89

negligence. 188

These principles,

which remain valid today,

may be useful in developing policies and procedures to avert
or reduce negligence in service-learning placements:
(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)
(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Exercise due care:
The administrator of the
program or educational institution should attempt
to foresee dangers to students and take whatever
precautions seem reasonable to avoid them.
Establish rules for the guidance of staff.
Assign adequate supervision for the activity.
Courts do not expect schools to be insurers of
student safety, but supervision is expected to be
adequate for the circumstances.
Increase efforts to assure student safety in
proportion to the potential for danger to result in
injury or harm.
Acknowledge the direct correlation between and an
activity's relationship to the school program and
accountability; and prepare administrators to be
held accountable for student well-being when the
activity is closely related to the purposes and
program of the sponsoring education institution.
Provide additional
safeguards
to
insure that
students
are
not
placed
or
brought
into
circumstances that are
fraught
with inherent
danger.
If the potential for danger is known in
advance, adult students must be apprised of it; and
parents of non-adult students must be informed of
it prior to their children's involvement in the
service-learning experience.
Educate the service-learning staff to the reality
that the degree of expected care under the law and
the degree of required supervision based on age are
inversely proportional.
Remember that the location in which a student is
injured is only one of the factors used in
determining whether negligence exists and the
subsequent extent of administrative liability. 189

In addition to the NASSP suggestions above,

others suggest

that good community relations, proper orientation and training
188

Responsibilities for Student Injury Occurring Off
School Property:
A Legal Memorandum, Reston, VA:
National

Association of Secondary School Principals, March-April 1975,
p.6.
189

Ibid.

90
may

be

the

best

ways

of

diffusing

the

problem

of

liability. 190

190

"Liability: A Growing Concern," The Campus Compact
Newsletter 4: 4, Spring/Summer 1990 indicating that no lawsuits
or threats of suits arose from the placement of 20,000
students with volunteer agencies and attributing this success
to an "effective, well-regarded program that communicates well
with students, staff, and the community ... because good will
goes beyond the legal ramifications of the situation."

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From this educator's perspective,
service-learners
unclear.
to

become

expands.

as

a

designated

student

group

remains

However, certain trends are emerging and are likely
more

evident

as

the

body

of

related

case

law

This chapter will summarize the findings of the
draw conclusions based on those

research for this paper,
findings,

the legal status of

and make recommendations for future research and

policy development.

Secondary Schools
For

secondary

school

service-learning programs,

students
current

enrolled
case

in

required

law suggests

that

schools have the right to require service-learning experiences
as for-credit graduation requirements without infringing on
students' or parents' Constitutional rights. The determination
in

Steirer 91 ,

though

arrived

at

through

incomplete

reasoning, 192 seems to have settled the Constitutional issues

191

789 F Supp 1337 (E.D. PA 1992), aff'd, 987 F.2d 989
(3d Cir.) cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 85 (1993).
192

See supra n164 discussing the limitations of the
argument used to arrive at the holding in Steirer.
91

92

at this level of education.
Also at this time,

service-learning requirements which

are part of the secondary school curriculum create no labor
law entanglements because of the general acceptance of "in
loco

parentis"

status

for

teachers

of

children

and

interpretations of the language structures in the Thirteenth
Amendment.

Furthermore, risk managers suggest that concerns

for liability issues related to service-learning programs may
be minimized by incorporating risk management plans for these
programs into existing plans for cooperative, work-study and
community-based

education

programs

which

possess

long

histories of successful risk management in secondary education
curricula.
Alternatively,
policies

schools could model the procedures and

for service-learning programs after those of

the

aforementioned existing programs or subsume the policies and
procedures of all experience-based education programs into
comprehensive new plans using the most successful components
of the various existing individual plans. 193

Additionally,

because community service is a recognized curricular strategy
for developing good citizens, as service-learning programs are
articulated,

the

goal

for

school

personnel

should be

to

identify methods of protection that complement service rather
than prohibit it . 194
193

Independent Sector, "Liability" 3.

194

4 Campus Compact Newsletter 4:1, Spring/Summer 1990
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It is generally recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the right of parents to direct the education of their
children.
offspring

However,
has

this right to direct the education of
as

not,

been

clearly

designated

a

Because this right is not a fundamental

fundamental right.
right,

yet,

review of parent claims to direct the education of

their

children

is

classified under

rational

basis

review

except where the challenge is premised in religious belief or
when parents are requesting some degree of control over their
children's education.

These latter conditions both require

review under strict scrutiny or a balance of parents'
state's

interests,

as

noted

in

Chapel

Hill. 195

and

Under

rational basis review, a court is only required to determine
whether a challenged public school requirement for students
has a valid educational purpose.
question becomes,

Worded another way,

the

"Is the required service against public

policy?"
The value of the service, a policy position,
issue

in

this

case.

is not at

The question is whether or not

the

service infringes on student rights to guaranteed protection
from involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment and
their rights to free expression as guaranteed under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments along with their parents' rights to
direct their education.

195

2525) .

Appellants Reply Brief at 5,

Chapel

Hill

(No. 95-
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While the involuntary servitude concern was addressed by
the various courts, the analogies used to rationalize court
positions

leave

room

for

reconsideration

of

issue. 196

the

The free expression concerns were never adequately addressed.
Yet,

the

courts

in Rye Neck and Chapel Hill accepted the

holding in Steirer as persuasive authority. In this milieu, a
key issue for courts should be the reexamination of mandatory
service programs for secondary school graduation in light of
previous Supreme Court decisions which interpret protection of
student rights to free expression. 197

While Steirer closed

the discussion, it accomplished its task without a sound legal
argument

grounded

in

Constitutional

principles

enunciated

through previous First Amendment decisions by the Supreme
Court.
Another
whether or

issue not
not

the

addressed by the

requirement

curriculum of the school.
remains:

part

of

the

is

academic

Here the question to be answered

Is non-compliance with a secondary school service

requirement
approval,

was

Steirer court

for

receives

requirement,

graduation
no

which

administrative

needs

faculty direction,

is

not

a

course

and must be done on the student's own time a

valid condition for denial of a secondary school diploma?
this a curricular requirement?

If it is not,

Is

then is the

196

The analogies used by the courts included mandated
substance abuse programs, public duty exceptions, required
community service for criminal offenders.
197

See supra nn44, 46 - 49 and accompanying text.
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service really an extra-curricular activity for which credit
is given?
By definition extra-curricular means not part of
required curriculum.

the

Can a school compel participation in an

activity which is not part

of

the

curriculum by awarding

credit for completion of the activity?

Can it provide credit

for completion of that activity which is not part of the
prescribed curriculum and then deny the right to graduate to
a student who does not receive credit for completion of that
activity which is extra-curricular, not part of the required
curriculum?
Schools posses the right

to establish curriculum and

graduation requirements within state and/or system frameworks.
However, the Steirer court never reviewed the manner in which
the requirement was to be met. Instead it addressed the policy
issue, the value of the service requirement, which never was
disputed by the students or their parents.
Because

of

the

quasi-contractual

relationship of

students and schools

education,

is

it

likely that

nature

of

the

in private secondary

courts would recognize the

school's authority to dismiss students who opposed the
mandatory service-learning requirement as presented in the
cases discussed above.

However,

even in this

arena,

the

fairness of structuring a for-credit graduation requirement to
be completed on one's own time without faculty direction or
course

relationship

remains

a

valid

concern

which

might

96
trigger a legal issue.

Higher Education
Generally the law recognizes higher education students as
adults . 198

However,

this

recognition

continues

dissonance in the student-university relationship.
courts

accept

indicates

movement

relationship
power.

the

relationship
in

between

as

society and
all

parties

to

While most

contractual,
the

with

law

create

Prosser

toward a

unequal

duty

bargaining

Even where duty, not contract, is the issue, writers

and commentators acknowledge that courts defer to colleges and
universities. 199

As a result of this pattern, some students

do not receive fair treatment in the courts because of their
unequal

bargaining

positions

relative

to

institutions

of

higher education.
While

"in

loco

parentis" principle does not apply to adult students,

some

courts

it

apply

is

the

generally

principle

accepted

based

on

that

the

the

status

of

the

educational institution as college rather than university.
This pattern of incongruent decisions suggests the student-

198

Rabel v. Ill. Wesleyan University 161 Ill. App. 3d
348 (1987); Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3rd Cir.
1979) .
199

See Victoria J. Dodd, 33 Kan.L.Rev.
702 at 730
stating, 11 • • • the tort argument as presented in the student's
case is generally not explored in the opinion, nor is the
issue ruled upon;" but there is a "growing tendency to impose
tort liability on schools for failing to properly control
third parties" in instances of dormitory safety.
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college/university relationship may require closer analysis to
define the

specific parameters of the

formulating generalizations about
postsecondary service-learners.

the

relationship before
legal

status of all

However, some trends may be

valid.
In jurisdictions where contracts of enrollment direct the
student-institution relationship, contracts between students
and educational institutions should be clearly articulated so
that

students

understand

responsibilities

the

and rights

extent

and those

and

limits

that

of

their

belong to

the

institutions in which they have matriculated. As a general
rule, contracts in higher education tend to be contracts of
adhesion 200

of

Furthermore,

which

students

have

limited awareness. 201

contracts negotiated with community sites on

behalf of students also should be written and explained to
students in language that is understandable.
Where an institutional duty to protect students has been
recognized, placement sites should be selected with student
safety as a consideration,
educational

institution

However, to protect itself, the
which

places

the

student

should

negotiate to place responsibility for training, supervision,
and evaluation of the service-learner with the host site.

By

shifting this responsibility from the school to the site, if
a

service-learner

is

injured

200

Id. at 714 - 718.

201

Ray, supra n13.

in

the

course

of

providing

98

service,

of

characteristics

the

the

employer-employee

relationship arise out of the student-site relationship rather
than the school-student relationship.
as

a

referral

service

for

the

The school merely acts
student. 202

Such

an

arrangement limits the potential for legal action against the
school and its agents while protecting the student in the
event of injury on the site.

Education Students
Authority recognizing student teachers as employees is in
conflict. 203

Student status in these programs ranges from

employee of a
district

in

state university to employee of
which

Therefore

it

is

receiving

school

the

student

important
districts

for
and

is

placed

placement
schools

to

to

the

school

undefined.

directors

and

understand

the

limits of protection guaranteed to student teachers in their
states

and

to

educate

these

service-learners

about

the

parameters of their rights and responsibilities under the laws
of the state in which they are serving.

This is especially

important in programs which require students to student teach
in a day school and a
202

203

residential school before they are

See supra nl85 and accompanying text.

See supra nl32 and accompanying text indicating that
student teachers placed from state universities in Colorado
are employees of the state university and when placed in a
school and injured in the course of their student teaching
experience are therefore employees;
see also supra nl33
indicating student teachers are employees of the district in
which they are placed for Workers' Compensation benefits.

99

certified

because

these

students

often

complete

their

requirements in two different states.
In Illinois,

California and Colorado,

student teachers

usually are protected under Workmen's Compensation Rules in
the

event

However,

of

injury during a

students

injured

student

during

teaching placement.

pre-service

observation

periods may or may not be protected under school codes.

In

states where these students are classified as volunteers,
clinical observation students are protected only to the same
extent as other volunteers acting in similar situations.
As a result of case law, pre-service clinical observation
students

in

Illinois

are

classified as

volunteers. 204

As

such, they may be covered under compensation laws if it can be
shown that at the time of injury the work being done by the
student arose out of an employment relationship. However, the
burden of proof rests with the student.

If it can be shown

that the primary benefit of the student's work flows to the.
school

rather than the education student him/herself,

the

school also may be considered the employer; the student then
may be entitled to worker's compensation.
When

a

service-learner,

while

in

the

course

of

a

university placement in a school, commits a wilful and wanton
204

See supra n127 and accompanying text which discusses
an Industrial Commission determination indicating that the 100
hours of clinical observation performed by an education
student to complete a state-imposed university requirement did
not qualify the student for compensation when the student was
injured in a fall at the school in the course of completing
those hours.

100
act which results in injury to another or damage to property,
the

limited

volunteer

is

105/108.70)

protection

the

forfeited
If

the

person

under

student

is

entitled

Illinois
is

not

law

to

as

(805

compensated

for

a

ILCS
the

service being performed in the school and if the act is not
wilful and wanton, the student will receive some protection
under the law.

However, if this same service-learner provides

service to a park district sports team instead of a school,
(s)he may receive compensation for reasonable expenses or a
modest honorarium for services as a referee or umpire

(745

ILCS 80/1) and remain classified as a volunteer under the law.
If this same volunteer furnishes medical services in a free
clinic,

( s) he must be licensed to provide medical care to

humans. Additionally, the lawful limits on liability for this
volunteer must be posted at the clinical site.

If they are

not posted, they do not apply (225 ILCS 60/31).
Considering

the

above

distinctions

which

apply

to

service-learners in volunteer roles in Illinois, institutions
of higher education which place students in required servicelearning situations should be aware of the circumstances and
contexts in which the students are volunteering. Even though
persons

responsible

for

identifying or approving service-

learning placements for students may consider all volunteer
positions

analogous,

indicate that

the

in Illinois,

previously
at

least

enumerated
these

statutes

three types of

service-learners are treated differently under the law.

101
of

Lack

familiarity

the

jeopardize

security

volunteer

with

student

of

statutes

may

service-learners,

educational institutions, and placement sites or their clients
in the event of injury or damage to property.

Depending on

the language and structure of statues related to volunteers,
this also may be true in other states. Therefore a systematic
review of these statutes and their interpretations on a stateby-state

basis may be

necessary to

clarify

the

roles

of

service-learners classified as volunteers.
Also, classification of students as volunteers does not
As noted in

mean the law will view them as non-employees.
Barragan v.
(1987),

Worker's Compensation Board,

2 4 0 Cal Rpt r

811

students who are injured in the course of degree-

required internships may be employees under the law if the
service is rewarded by training and instruction, the service
site directs the activities of the students and accords the
students

the

same

treatment

as

other

employees,

and

no

classified

as

exclusions for students exist under state statute.

Medical Students
The

legal

arena

for

service-learners

interns and residents is equally complex.

In California for

example, medical residents may be simultaneously students and
employees. 205
Depending
205

on

This
the

may

terms

be
of

true
their

in

other

enrollment,

See supra n145 and accompanying text.

states,

too.

students

in

102

nursing

programs

may

compensation acts. 206

or

may

However,

not

be

employees

within

medical technician trainees

and nurse's aide trainees who receive uncompensated training
in hospitals usually are considered non-employees.

Therefore,

these service-learners usually are classified as students for
purposes of insurance, compensation and liability.
case

law

focuses

on

issues

of

control

and

While most

supervision, 207

analyses of who benefits most from the work of the medical
service-learners

could

amplify

understanding

of

the

distinctions between service-learners who are employees and
service-learners classified as non-employees. 208

Liability
For purposes of liability based on negligence, the law
requires all actors to respond in a manner consistent with
persons of the same age in similar circumstances and similar
contexts.

(The only exception may be very young children.)

Central to liability premised on negligence is the principle

206

See supra nn137 - 147 and accompanying text.

207

Id.

208

Analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this
paper.
However, if one considers that various aspects of
hospital activities are run solely by residents and interns,
it is obvious that the organization receives an important
economic benefit from the work of these service-learners.
Whereas the activities performed by service-learners as
technicians and aides usually provides greater benefit to the
students than to the hospital because these service-learners
generally do not function in isolation and usually do not
possess decision-making authority as do residents.

103
that the legal burden on students increases in proportion to
their age and experience. This principle is demonstrated in
the

legal

cases

cited

students 209

vocational

involving

and

should

skill
be

acquisition

made

known

to

by
all

service-learners.
For

teachers

and

administrators

it

is

important

to

realize that although statutory law in each state is unique,
determination of negligence always is a question for a jury;
it

is

not

Furthermore,

a

matter

of

law

for

a

judge

to

decide. 210

the level of culpability in a negligence suit is

to be determined by the

court;

it

is

not

a

statement

of

fact. 211
It is generally agreed that teachers are not insurers of
student safety.
service-learning

Case law exists supporting this principle for
programs

in

schools 212

secondary

and

postsecondary schools. 213
What is important to bear in mind is that teachers at all
levels of education are responsible for supervision of their
students.

However, as the age of the students increases, the

level of supervision expected of the teachers diminishes.
209

See supra nn58 - 88 and accompanying text.

210

Hackathorne v. Preisse, 661 N.E.2d 384 (Ohio App. 9
Dist. 1995).
211

212

Id.

where this is explicated under Ohio law.

See supra
accompanying texts.
213

nn6 O

77,

80

83

t

85

88

See supra nn78, 79, 84 and accompanying texts.

and
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When students are adults, courts expect that they will be able
to follow certain types of directions given by an instructor
without

the

instructor's

direct

supervision. 2 ~

This

concept has important ramifications for higher education.

It

may limit teacher culpability when direct supervision is not
provided to a service-learner if evidence supports a finding
that directions were given prior to the placement.
Where inadequate supervision of service-learners in skill
acquisition placements may expose schools to tort liability,
it is important for institutions and students to recognize
that such liability may be limited by a scope of duties which
Also,

are narrowly defined.
subjective.
be

to

such liability may be highly

The essential concern for administrators should

prudently

oversee

the

design,

development,

and

administration of a school's service-learning curriculum and
to provide appropriate training and supervision for faculty or
staff who bear responsibility for the program.
Where liability under respondeat superior is at issue,
case

law

exists

suggesting

college/universities
Illinois

a

may

vocational

that

have

the

education

secondary
law

on

schools

their

teacher's

side.

control

and
In
over

students who may be considered service-learners is not the
same as an employer's control over an employee. 215
2

~
Levine v. Live Oak Masonic Housing,
489 (La.App.3 Cir. 1986)

215

Dist.1995)

Knapp

v.

Hill,

627

N.E.2d

1068

Further

Inc. 491 So.2d
( I 11 . App . 1st
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research is necessary to determine if this is true in other
states also.
In California a

student-athlete is not considered an

employee of his/her institution of higher education. 216
While

this

case

is not

on-point,

the

clearly articulated

reasoning of the court indicates the role of public policy in
court decisions and suggests that court decisions arising out
of

service-learning

institutions.

As

also
the

may

be

Townsend

resolved

court

in

favor

stated,

"From

of
the

standpoint of public policy consideration, exposing [private
and public institutions of higher education]

to vicarious

liability for torts committed in athletic competition would
create

a

severe

resources."

drain

on

the

State's

precious

education

Using this statement as persuasive authority,

a

court, one day, might reason that service-learners also should
not be considered employees of their colleges\universities.
In
programs

the

1970s

were

training,
students

216

advised

supervision,
with

entanglements
placements

cooperative

in

the
that

to negotiate
control

host
could

states

education

site
arise

outside

and
to
as
the

and

work-study

agreements

that

place

of

these

evaluation
avoid
a

the

result

state

in

Townsend v. State, 237 Cal. Rptr. 146
Dist. 1987).

labor
of

law

student

which

the

(Cal. App. 2

106
educational ins ti tut ion is situated. 217 This remains prudent
advice even today.
However,
ascertain

the

the

caveat

safety

that placing

of

placement

Additionally

overlooked.
community

relations,

risk

ins ti tut ions
sites

managers

must

not

be

recommend

good

coverage

and

insurance

adequate

should

appropriate staff training and evaluation as key components in
a program designed to limit potential risks for organizations
and

their

As

service-learners.

at

the

secondary

level,

rulings affecting traditional cooperative education,

work-

study and pro-bono placements which are required for four year
degree-seeking students also suggest addressing the potential
liability

concerns

under

existing

program

policies

and

procedures which already have taken into account potential
programmatic risks.
While

risk

managers

continue

to

suggest

increasing

insurance coverage to protect institutions and students,

a

cost-benefit analysis may generate some new insights into the
effect

of

increased

insurance

coverage

for

students

and

institutions involved in service-learning programs which may
include but are not limited to experience-based programs in
career development, academic knowledge, skill development or
some

combination

compensated.
217

for

which

students

may

or

may

not

be

Finally, as in secondary education, the goal of

See supra n185 and accompanying text discussing this
point in the context of Wuerffel v. Westinghouse Corporation,
148 N.J.Super. 327, 372 A.2d 659.
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any risk management plan related to service-learning in higher
education should be identification of protection methods that
complement

service-learning which has

been verified

as

a

legitimate curriculum strategy to foster good citizenship.
For the time being, the legal status of service-learning
is settled at the secondary level;

concerns continue to exist

at the college/university level.

At both levels,

based in negligence and the

liability

level of culpability will be

determined by the reasonable person standard which compares
the behavior of the tortfeasor to a person of the same age, in
a

similar

worker's

circumstance

context.

Employee

compensation benefits generally is

state codes;
respondea t

policy.

and

status

for

determined by

but assignment of vicarious liability under

superior

will

probably

be

directed

by

public

Finally for purposes of risk management, inclusion of

service-learners

in

institutional

insurance

policies

is

advisable.

Recommendations
1.

Include the community stakeholders in the development of
service-learning policies which clearly delineate the
mission, vision, and goals of the programs.

2.

Provide site-specific training for school personnel who
have supervisory responsibility at sites.

3.

Document all training and evaluation.

4.

Develop,

distribute,

and

adhere

to

policies

and
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procedures articulated in program-specific handbooks.
5.

Review and update handbooks regularly.

6.

Negotiate

to

transfer

responsibility

for

training,

supervision and evaluation of service-learners from the
sending institution to the receiving institution.
7.

Develop

a

list

of

acceptable

placements

and

allow

students to select their own placements.
8.

Inform students and program personnel of applicable laws
(state

school

codes;

state workers'

compensation and

volunteer statutes; and federal labor and wage/hour laws)
9.

Inform service-learners of their status as volunteers or
employees whenever it is known.

10.

Be sure your volunteers are respected as volunteers and
not allowed to replace employees or function at the same
level as site employees unless the volunteer activity as
implemented is specifically protected under the law.

10.

Remember that you and your institution may be vicariously
liable

for the negligence of a

service-learner under

respondeat superior if your institution shares training,
supervisory, and evaluatory responsibilities with a host
site.
11.

Include all service-learners and related personnel under
your instituion's liability insurance policy.

12.

Develop good community relations which include fostering
awareness of

the mission,

service-learning program.

vision,

and goals

of your
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